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I. SYMBOLS IN LAW AND SOCIETY
Institutions, as intermediaries between a society and individuals, serve as the
vehicles through which social life is conducted, and they are therefore integral to the
development and operation of every society.1 Indeed, institutions are the basic
components of a society.2 Moreover, because a society is a system, each institution
can affect and be affected by every other institution. Law, the family, and religion
are institutions, for example, and able to influence one another.
To function smoothly, a society must, of course, be comprised of institutions that
contribute to it in positive ways. These contributions occur to the extent that
institutions fulfill the recognized needs and embody the paramount values of their
*
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1

Donald N. Levine, Introduction, in GEORG SIMMEL: ON INDIVIDUALITY
FORMS: SELECTED WRITINGS xv-xvii, xxvi (Donald N. Levine ed. 1971).

AND

SOCIAL

2

In this article, the word “institution” refers to a general pattern of interpersonal behavior
that exists in a society and that is central to the operation of the society. An institution is thus
“an established . . . custom, usage, practice . . . or other element in the political or social life of
a people; a regulative principle or convention subservient to the needs of an organized
community or the general ends of civilization.” 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1047 (2nd ed.
1989).
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society. Indeed, if an institution does not aid the operation of the system in which it
exists, the institution will change so that its doctrines and practices do so.
Sociological imperatives, not individual personalities, ultimately mold the character
of institutions.3
Unfortunately, the preceding principles of macrosociology seem rarely to be the
concern of research on the institution of law. With few exceptions, scholarship in
law simply takes for granted the institutional character of law, and the societal
foundation of the institution is, therefore, generally ignored. However, law must be
understood in its societal context, for law would not be an institution unless it was a
sociological necessity. Law, that is, does something for society that is vital. But
what? The answer, in part, seems to be that law allows each participant in a potential
interpersonal relationship to expect certain behavior from the other participant(s).4
This function is important sociologically because reliance on expectations of others’
behavior is at the foundation of interpersonal relationships, and the fulfillment of
such expectations is necessary for a viable social order. But while law helps to make
possible interpersonal relationships and hence a social system,5 how it performs this
function has yet to be established. The particular mechanisms involved, and the
exact role and relative importance of each mechanism, have not been widely agreed
upon by social scientists and scholars who study law.
The present article focuses on one mechanism that has been of interest to
researchers—viz., symbols. Students of the institution of law have long contended
that law has a symbolic character6 and that the symbols of the institution can
strengthen the fabric of social life and promote the cohesion of society.7 Although a
social system will, over time, change its specific symbols of law and the prominence
given to such symbols generally, law-related symbols may be attracting more
attention from the average American now than in the past. Indeed, one scholar has
suggested that a central characteristic of the United States is “the development of
public reverence for the symbols of law.”8
While the particular symbols of law in a society may shift over time and may be
less important at some points in history than at others, symbols of law are probably
never completely absent from a society and never completely unimportant. Societies
uniformly seem to develop and use symbols9 because “[s]ymbols help citizens
organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those

3

LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT 14-19 (1993).

4

Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in
the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 793, 794-95 (2006).
5
Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1237 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that “[s]ocial
order is based on law, . . . .”).
6

E.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).

7

E.g., John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Anasazi Jurisprudence, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 423
(1998).
8

Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV. 77, 78-79
(1994).
9

KAREN A. CERULO, IDENTITY DESIGNS: THE SIGHTS AND SOUNDS OF A NATION 12 (1995).
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who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization.”10 Symbols from the
institution of law seem to be beneficial, and are probably indispensable, for
sustaining a social system. The societal importance of symbols of law is indicated
by the diversity of these symbols,11 which include far more than the well-known
blindfolded female figure holding balanced scales and a sword.12 Indeed, a symbol
of the institution of law may be drawn from another institution in the society,13 and
under certain conditions, a symbol of the institution may be an individual who has
intentionally violated a statute and committed a felony.14
The present article focuses on symbolic concepts and doctrines in statutes and in
court rules and opinions.15 Symbolism has been noted in statutes that define
behavior as criminal;16 in legislation that recognizes marriage and specifies the sex
composition of the married couple;17 and in the Securities Act of 1933,18 the original
(and still a fundamental) federal statute dealing with securities.19 Accordingly, it is
logical to assume that there is symbolism in the concepts and doctrines of other
statutes and in the concepts and doctrines of rules adopted by regulatory bodies. Part
III of this article illustrates the assumption with the federal Investment Advisers
Act.20 Part IV pursues the assumption further with a very different subject, namely,
the appearance-of-impropriety standard for assessing attorney behavior.
Specifically, Part IV employs the standard in an attempt to isolate some of the

10
Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 34 (2001).
11

Barnett, supra note 4, at 821-24.

12

E.g., Glover v. State, 386 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (Benham, J., concurring).

13

Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 882 (1988).

14

Paul Kooistra, Criminals as Heroes: Linking Symbol to Structure, 13 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 217 (1990).
15

Concepts and doctrines in the Constitution of the United States, and in court decisions
interpreting the Constitution, can also be symbols. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 34; see Gene
R. Nichol, Toward a People's Constitution, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 621 (2003) (book review)
(“The Constitution is not quite as potent a symbol to us as the flag, but it occupies a close
second.”). Indeed, since the Constitution is the charter of the nation as a sovereign entity, the
clauses in it that express cultural ideals are inescapably symbolic, and the document as a
whole is, too. Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L. J. 1290, 12991300 (1937); see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1950).
16
E.g., V. F. Nourse, Twenty-five Years of George P. Fletcher’s Rethinking Criminal Law:
Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925, 934 (2004)
(“[C]rime legislation is a powerful symbol of public and political order and stability.”).
17

Kathleen E. Hull, The Cultural Power of Law and the Cultural Enactment of Legality:
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 629, 638 (2003).
18

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (1997 & Supp. 2005).

19

Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 142
(2005).
20

Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1- 80b –21 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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societal conditions that contribute to symbolism in the doctrines of law. The attempt
will advance the understanding of law provided by the discipline of sociology, which
rests on the assumption that the properties of a society have broad effects on the
institutions of the society.
Unfortunately, while scholars trained in the discipline of law have understood
that law has a symbolic nature, they have not undertaken, or joined with sociologists
in undertaking, rigorous quantitative research on the circumstances in which, the
variations in the degree to which, and the paths by which law as symbol affects and
is affected by the social order. These questions must be answered, however, if a
useful body of knowledge is to be developed on law as an institution. Key questions
regarding law that involves symbolism, therefore, have not been studied with the
research tools offering the greatest power and precision. The situation exists partly
because few scholars trained in law appreciate that numeric information can be used
to investigate the questions and that quantitative data can be analyzed with statistical
techniques to obtain estimates of the answers to the questions.21 The situation is
probably compounded by a resistance on the part of law school faculty-scholars to
acknowledging that the content of law is closely tied to—indeed, that the content of
law directly results from—the character of the society in which law is embedded.22
Nonetheless, well-designed research on questions of law and symbolism is missing
not just from the professional output of law-trained scholars. Even sociologists,
many of whom are highly skilled in measurement and data analysis, have undertaken
few quantitative studies of symbols relevant to law and of the role of these symbols
in social life.23 The situation in sociology is notable given the existence in the
discipline of a school whose very name—symbolic interaction—directs attention to
symbols.24 The rudimentary state of present knowledge regarding symbols in law
and society thus cannot be explained solely by the work of scholars educated in law,
but is attributable also to researchers educated in sociology.
Because symbols are central to this article, their defining characteristics need to
be identified. In doing so, the concept of “symbol” must be juxtaposed with the
concept of “sign,” and the similarities as well as the differences between symbols

21

Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 163,
185, 192 (2004). Moreover, scholars in the field of law who conduct empirical studies
typically do so without employing the rules of scientific inference. Lee Epstein & Gary King,
Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2002). Therefore, these studies supply “considerably less accurate information
about the empirical world than the studies’ stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions
suggest.” Id. at 6-7.
22
Edward L. Rubin, Social Movements and Law Reform: Passing Through the Door:
Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 78-80 (2001).
23

The studies that have been conducted are: CERULO, supra note 9; Karen A. Cerulo,
Sociopolitical Control and the Structure of National Symbols: An Empirical Analysis of
National Anthems, 68 SOC. FORCES 76 (1989); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531
(1992).
24
Cf. Fred Davis, On the ‘Symbolic’ in Symbolic Interaction, 5 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
111 (1982) (contending that symbolic interaction as an approach has focused on interaction
and ignored symbols).
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and signs must be identified. In terms of similarities, neither symbols nor signs on
their own have intrinsic meanings. Instead, symbols and signs represent other things,
which may be tangible or intangible, and they produce responses because their
referents have been learned. Symbols and signs, consequently, are alike in the
societal function they perform—each transmits meaning and, in doing so, is integral
to the development and operation of societies.25 Without symbols and signs, a
society is probably incapable of having an economy of even modest complexity, a
population of even modest size, or technology of even modest sophistication.
What distinguishes symbols from signs? Collectively, signs form a, or the,
language employed in a society,26 i.e., the signs in a group are the vehicles that make
possible mutual understanding and interpersonal coordination.27 To be effective in a
language, of course, a sign (which can be verbal or nonverbal) must have a specific
referent; a sign whose meaning is ambiguous impedes rather than facilitates social
interaction. A symbol, on the other hand, possesses meanings that are of greater
complexity. Thus, a symbol communicates a message in the society using the
symbol that is broader and more complicated than the message communicated by a
sign. Moreover, a symbol is more likely than a sign to have an impact on individuals
that is emotional in nature28 and that, for neurological reasons, occurs partly at a
subconscious level.29 For instance, the word “flag” is a sign whose referent is
immediately intelligible and readily explained, but a flag in cloth or other tangible
form is a symbol with a complex meaning that is, by comparison to its sign, less
easily comprehended through oral or written descriptions.30 The importance to a
group of the referent of a symbol, furthermore, confers importance on the symbol;
thus, the cloth flag of a nation is socially significant in its own right as a symbol of
the nation.31
25

See Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language,
in LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (Leslie
Spier ed., 1941), reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 134, 154, 156, 159 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956); INO ROSSI, FROM THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SYMBOLS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF SIGNS 23, 52-53 (1983).
26

ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 4 (1988).

27

GARTH GILLAN, FROM SIGN TO SYMBOL 7 (1982).

28

Ute Krudewagen, Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag
Desecration Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal
Constitutional Court, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679, 679, 681-683 (2002).
29

David D. Franks, Mutual Interests, Different Lenses: Current Neuroscience and
Symbolic Interaction, 26 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 613 (2003).
30

See J. STEVEN OTT, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PERSPECTIVE 21-22 (1989).

31

For this reason, statutes have prohibited intentional damage to tangible forms of the
national flag of the United States. As applied to individuals who have deliberately damaged
U.S. flags that they owned and who did so for the purpose of communicating a political
message, the statutes have been judicially invalidated under the First Amendment to the
Constitution. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313, 315-316 (1990). However, First
Amendment case law does not deny the meaning attached to physical forms of the flag; rather,
case law is an indicator of the greater weight placed by society on the cultural value(s)
protected by the Amendment.
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The preceding explanation of the nature of symbols may be aided by a dictionary
definition of the word “symbol.” Although dictionaries vary in the way they define
the word, an illuminating definition depicts a symbol as:
5. an object or act that represents a repressed complex through
unconscious association rather than through objective resemblance or
conscious substitution[;] 6. an act, sound, or material object having
cultural significance and the capacity to excite or objectify a response. 32
A symbol, then, carries a broad, intricate meaning in standing for something else
and is visible, audible, and/or touchable. A visible, touchable symbol includes the
fabric flag of a country and a metal or wood religious artifact such as the Latin cross.
An audible symbol is exemplified by a musical composition that has been formally
adopted by a government as the official anthem of the country—the “Star Spangled
Banner” in the case of the United States33—or that is closely but informally
identified with the country, e.g., the song “God Bless America” by the composer
Irving Berlin. However, an item cannot be a symbol for a group unless the
participants in the group recognize the referent(s) of the item. That is, a particular
item is symbolic only if the meaning of the item is apprehended. The intention of the
producer of the item is insufficient by itself to make the item a symbol.
What is the function of symbols for society?34 Macrosociology defines a society
as a human group that operates through and is maintained by institutions.
Consequently, if an institution begins to damage its society, the institution will
change—although possibly with a substantial time lag—so that it ceases to do so
and, instead, supports the social order.35 Thus, as an institution, law in all of its
forms—including statutes, administrative agency and court rules, and court
decisions—manifests the acknowledged needs36 and represents the prevailing values
of society, and in the long run, the concepts and doctrines of law act as the
sociological equivalent of a magnet, attracting participants to their society rather than
driving them away. Law promotes the overall functioning of society by, in part,
supplying symbols that solidify social life,37 and because law as an institution must
32

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2316 (unabridged ed. 1993).

33

36 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).

34

To the extent that symbols perform the function subtly—which may happen often—
measurement of the function is difficult.
35

See Larry D. Barnett, When Is a Mutual Fund Director Independent? The Unexplored
Role of Professional Relationships Under Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, 4
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. 155, 155-160 (2006).
36
A societal need is any condition that is required for a society to be workable and that
results in institutional change. The concept of “societal need” is discussed in Larry D. Barnett,
The Roots of Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 613, 672-77 (2007).
37

Three justices of the United States Supreme Court recognized the symbolic aspect of
law, but seem to have underestimated its societal importance, when they wrote: “We cannot
ignore that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility.” New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
For the social system, however, the utility of law stems partially from the symbols generated
by law. Furthermore, in some situations, the utility of the symbolic aspect of law probably
equals or surpasses other benefits to society furnished by the institution of law. Law, for
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not weaken the bond between a social system and its participants,38 the symbols of
law will change as large-scale forces alter the properties of society.
But how do we know when law is operating as a symbol? Otherwise expressed,
by what observable measure(s) can we determine whether a particular concept or
doctrine is a symbol? Unless the question is answered, quantitative research cannot
be undertaken on the societal role of symbols of law, for such research requires that
the presence—and, when appropriate, the magnitude—of every relevant variable be
accurately identified. Whether a particular concept or doctrine of law is a symbol or
is not a symbol involves a variable, because there are two mutually exclusive states
one of which logically must exist. Moreover, for law that has become a symbol, the
strength or importance of the symbol is a variable because strength/importance, by
definition, is characterized by gradations; strength/importance can differ between
symbols at any given point in time and can differ over time for any particular
symbol. Consequently, the symbolic aspect of law unavoidably involves at least one
variable—viz., whether or not law is a symbol—and law that is a symbol will
involve a second variable— viz., the intensity or salience of the symbol.
The concern of this article is with the first variable: How can an investigator
decide when a given concept or doctrine of law is a symbol? The decision can
probably be made using a number of alternative criteria, and given the limited state
of social science knowledge regarding symbols, it would be presumptuous to believe
that the criteria can be definitively and exhaustively listed at this time. Nonetheless,
one criterion can be suggested.
II. APPEARANCES AND SYMBOLISM IN LAW
Social science research will someday determine whether the comment that “[t]he
world is governed more by appearances than realities”39 is correct and whether the
characterization of the 1980s and 1990s as “an Age of Appearances” in the United
States40 is apt. Should these claims be proven wrong, however, they are likely to
have erred merely in degree. If most of social life is not influenced by appearances,
much undoubtedly is.
How do appearances achieve such influence? A social order, by definition,
requires predictability in the behavior of individuals and groups, and even in groups
with relatively few members, differentiated statuses and roles evidently emerge.41
The attributes of individuals and groups, consequently, are important in social life.
However, attributes can be socially relevant only when they are perceived, and
perception unavoidably entails interpretation. Indeed, the inherent character of

example, furnishes a social system with symbols that express cultural ideals, and these
symbols, “by creating a realm . . . where all our dreams of justice in an unjust world come
true,” in the long run promote the equilibrium of the system. Arnold, supra note 6, at 34-35.
38

See CERULO, supra note 9, at 120-121, 164, 168.

39

Daniel Webster, quoted in MICHAEL MONCUR’S (CYNICAL) QUOTATIONS, The Quotations
Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
40

PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY 2 (1997).

41

See John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland, Small Groups, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 415, 425-427 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY].
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attributes may be less significant to a society than the perception and interpretation
of the attributes. Research has found that the manner in which the attributes of
individuals and groups are perceived, as well as the context in which they are
perceived, affects the treatment of and responses to the individuals and groups
involved.42 In short, appearances—“the action or state of appearing or seeming to be
(to eyes or mind); semblance; looking like”43—are an inherent and unavoidable
aspect of life in a society.44
Two illustrations may help at this point. First, almost all parents give each of
their children a name that their culture associates with the biological sex of the
child.45 Sociologically, the name of an individual is not merely a label. Where
gender distinctions are deeply entrenched in the social fabric, as they are in the
United States,46 sex-appropriate names for individuals facilitate social interaction by
contributing to the appearance of the named individuals. To be exact, sex-linked
names assist a society in placing individuals in gender roles, and like all social roles,
gender roles involve conventions regarding appropriate behavior towards, as well as
by, the occupants of the roles.47 In the context of gender, then, the names of
individuals shape appearances and, in doing so, aid the functioning of society.
Second, evaluations of the physical features of an individual affect judgments that
others make of the individual.48 Thus, student beliefs about the physical
attractiveness of their college professors markedly influence the students’ ratings of

42
Theodore N. Greenstein & J. David Knottnerus, The Effects of Differential Evaluations
on Status Generalization, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 147 (1980); Jolanda Jetten et al., Group
Distinctiveness and Intergroup Discrimination, in SOCIAL IDENTITY: CONTEXT, COMMITMENT,
CONTENT 107 (Naomi Ellemers et al., eds., 1999).
43

1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 566 (2nd ed. 1989).

44
To employ a colloquialism, “‘[r]eality’ is the only word in the English language that
should always be used in quotes.” Author unknown, quoted in COLE’S QUOTABLES, The
Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
45

Stanley Lieberson et al., The Instability of Androgynous Names: The Symbolic
Maintenance of Gender Boundaries, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1249, 1260-1261, 1274 (2000).
46
The degree to which Americans at the present time are committed to traditional sex roles
is indicated by responses to a question included in a national sample survey of adults who
resided in the United States in 1990. Gallup Organization accession no. 237354 (May-June
1990), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL file. The question began by
mentioning change in sex roles and then asked interviewees to express their agreement or
disagreement with the statement that “A job is alright but what most women really want is a
home and children.” Id. Exactly half of all respondents agreed with the statement, while just
two out of five respondents disagreed with it. Id. The percentages agreeing and disagreeing
differed little between women and men. Id.
47
See Mary R. Jackman & Mary Scheuer Senter, Images of Social Groups: Categorical or
Qualified?, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 341, 355, 358 (1980); Tom Langford & Neil J. Mackinnon,
The Affective Bases for the Gendering of Traits: Comparing the United States and Canada, 63
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 34 (2000).
48

Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 41, at 151, 174.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/4

8

2007]

LAW AS SYMBOL

297

the teaching quality of the professors;49 judgments of the relative competence of
opposing candidates for Congress that are based on the candidates’ faces evidently
have a major bearing on the outcome of elections;50 and the degree to which the
facial traits of cadets at a military academy indicate dominance (rather than
submissiveness) affects the rank achieved by the cadets at the academy.51 In short,
the appearance of an individual has an impact on responses to the individual by
others.
My concern, however, is not with appearances qua appearances but with
appearances as symbols. What is responsible for infusing appearances with
symbolism? The question encompasses appearances in many contexts, but I will
consider just one, namely, law. Law acts as a symbol when, inter alia, it addresses
(e.g., regulates) appearances of a phenomenon that is significant to society,52 and law
that is explicitly directed at protecting (or eliminating) a recognized symbol of a
socially significant phenomenon is symbolic, too. The symbolism of such law
results from stimulus generalization, a phenomenon identified in the 1920s by the
noted scientist Ivan Pavlov that has come to be regarded by psychologists as an

49

James Felton et al., Web-based Student Evaluations of Professors: The Relations
Between Perceived Quality, Easiness, and Sexiness, 29 ASSESSMENT & EVALUATION IN
HIGHER EDUC. 91, 100-101, 106 (2004).
The heavy reliance that colleges and universities place on student-completed teaching
evaluation questionnaires is illustrative of the importance of appearances, even in
organizations that are ostensibly committed to rationality and empirically grounded
knowledge. Research indicates that the questionnaires are not highly accurate measures of the
degree to which students master assigned material. Larry D. Barnett, Are Teaching Evaluation
Questionnaires Valid? Assessing the Evidence, 25 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 335 (1996).
Moreover, relatively little is known about the negative effects of the questionnaires on faculty
members and students. Id. at 343. Appearances, therefore, are the primary basis for the use of
the questionnaires in personnel decisions by organizations of higher education.
50

Alexander Todorov et al., Inferences of Competence from Faces Predict Election
Outcomes, 308 SCI. 1623, 1623 (2005).
51
Allan Mazur et al., Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets’
Physical Features, 90 AM. J. SOC. 125, 140 (1984).
52

If law is symbolic when it deals with appearances of activities that are significant to
society, empirical research must be able to distinguish activities that are “significant” from
activities that are not. Unfortunately, theory in the sociology of law currently seems to be of
little or no help to researchers who are seeking to measure societal significance, which is
potentially ascertained from objective measures, from subjective measures, or from both.
Objectively, societal significance might be determined from quantitative data on conditions in
the society; such data on the United States are found inter alia in studies of the population of
the country undertaken by federal government agencies. Subjectively, societal significance
might be determined from the attitudes and values of the participants in society; data on
attitudes and values are available from surveys conducted by organizations in the private
sector using samples drawn from the population. The study of symbols in law will be limited
until sociological theory aids researchers in selecting both the most suitable approach to
societal significance—objective, subjective, or an objective-subjective combination—and the
most appropriate data within the approach.
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“undeniable characteristic” of human learning.53 Stimulus generalization, simply
described, involves a stimulus to which individuals learn a particular response and
which is subsequently joined by at least one additional stimulus that spontaneously
produces the response. Thus, stimulus generalization begins with the establishment
of a link between an initial stimulus and a certain reaction through positive and/or
negative reinforcement, i.e., reward and/or punishment; after the connection between
the initial stimulus and the reaction has been created, one or more other stimuli
generate the reaction without any reinforcement.54 In the context of the present
article, the initial stimulus would be appearances, the second stimulus would be law
that deals with appearances, and the response to each stimulus would be the social
meaning that constitutes a symbol.55
By way of illustration, the national flag of the United States, as a tangible
representation (i.e., appearance) of the country, is an acknowledged symbol.56 The
symbolism of the flag exists because the referent of the flag—the Nation—is socially
significant, and to promote and preserve this symbolism, federal statutes specify the
settings, circumstances, and manner in which the flag is to be displayed.57 Thus, a
federal statute seeks to preserve the symbolism of the flag by explicitly providing,
inter alia, that “[n]o disrespect should be shown to the flag of the United States of
America; the flag should not be dipped to any person or thing.”58 Through stimulus
generalization, statutes such as these acquire symbolism from the symbolism of the
flag.
Stimulus generalization has been employed in theoretical analyses to explain
social phenomena59 and in empirical research to account for symbolism in a lawbased government program.60
If it is widespread in social life, stimulus
generalization can be expected to occur with law that deals with appearances of
socially important phenomena, and the learned reaction that confers symbolism on
such appearances will be transferred to law focusing on these appearances. The
present article specifically assumes that stimulus generalization does so, although the
assumption has not been tested empirically by social scientists. Under the thesis of
53
David I. Mostofsky, Introduction, in STIMULUS GENERALIZATION 1, 1-2 (David I.
Mostofsky ed., 1965).
54

Id. at 1.

55

See supra text accompanying notes 28 to 33. In terms of strength and salience, the
symbolism of particular appearances is probably never less than, and in most cases probably
exceeds, the symbolism of law concerned with these appearances.
56

E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989).

57

4 U.S.C. §§ 6, 7 (2000).

58

Id. § 8.

59

Robert A. LeVine, The Role of Family in Authority Systems: A Cross-Cultural
Application of Stimulus-Generalization Theory, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 291 (1960); Richard M.
Merelman, Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 548, 558 (1966); Robert Frank
Weiss, Defection from Social Movements and Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements, 26
SOCIOMETRY 1 (1963).
60

David O. Sears et al., Whites’ Opposition to “Busing”: Self-Interest or Symbolic
Politics?, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 381 (1979).
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the article, then, dress codes for students imposed by public schools are symbolic.
The symbolism of dress codes arises because the codes target physical appearances
that have social meaning; through stimulus generalization, the meaning of the
physical appearances attaches to the dress codes applicable to the appearances and
makes the codes symbolic.61
While tangential to the article, law that does not focus on appearances may also
be symbolic. Specifically, law can serve as a symbol when it applies directly to or
reflects the particular phenomenon for which it was formulated. At least two types
of law in a society are in this category. They are symbolic because their function “is
not so much to guide society, as to comfort it.”62
The first type of law that is symbolic, even though it does not focus on
appearances, is law that is designed to regulate a socially significant activity.63 Law
of this type is expected by participants in the society that adopts it to be effective in
substantially altering the frequency of the activity, but, in fact, the law has little or no
influence on the incidence of the activity. Illustrations of such law include: (i) state
statutes that authorize the death penalty for individuals who commit the crime of
murder, (ii) state legislation that bars employment policies requiring union
61

In a survey conducted during 2002, a nationwide sample of adults in the United States
was asked whether “[s]etting dress codes in public schools that stop students from wearing
clothes that are too revealing or sloppy” would be “an effective solution for improving
people’s behavior.” In answering the question, respondents selected one of the following:
“very effective,” “somewhat effective,” “not too effective,” “not effective at all.” More than
half (55%) of the respondents thought dress codes would be “very effective.” Public Agenda
Foundation accession no. 401631 (Jan. 2-23, 2002), available at LEXIS, News and Business,
RPOLL File. Accord, Public Agenda Foundation accession no. 456449 (March 11-18, 2004),
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File (national sample of adult parents of
public school students who were in grades 5-12). Because the personal attire under
consideration breached accepted social standards (i.e., because the attire was “too revealing or
sloppy”), the behavior that would be “improved” by dress codes presumably violated social
standards, too. The belief that dress codes are a means of reducing socially unacceptable
behavior links attire to the character of social life. This link—which confers meaning on
personal attire and, in turn, dress codes—is evidently well-entrenched and widespread in the
United States inasmuch as most respondents believed that dress codes would be highly
effective in enhancing social behavior. School codes that bar grooming that deviates from
social norms seem to have been generally favored by Americans since at least the mid-1960s.
See Gallup Organization accession no. 39949 (Sept. 16-21, 1965), available at LEXIS, News
and Business, RPOLL File.
Under my thesis, most if not all of the physical appearances targeted by dress codes are
symbolic even if the individuals affected by the codes have no intent to communicate a
political or social message through their physical appearance. My thesis, therefore, is broader
than existing case law on the constitutionality of government-decreed dress codes. See Wendy
Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the
Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715 (1996). Furthermore, my thesis contends that the dress
codes themselves are symbolic when they address physical appearances characterized by
symbolism.
62

ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 34.

63

The regulatory law discussed in this paragraph is not concerned with appearances, but
regulation is the goal of much, if not most, of the law that focuses on appearances. Regulatory
law dealing with appearances is the subject of Parts III and IV of this article.
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membership or requiring abstention from union membership, and (iii) statutes that on
their face are intended to prohibit abortion. In spite of the widespread, relatively
intense feelings that have accompanied each of these topics64—feelings that have
undoubtedly helped to instill symbolism into law on the topics—such law has
evidently not had an appreciable impact on the murder rate,65 on the percentage of
64
Surveys of national samples of adults in the United States found that, from the mid1980s to the mid-1990s, between 53% and 67% of all respondents either “strongly” endorsed
or “strongly” opposed capital punishment. Center for Political Studies accession no. 259987
(Nov. 9, 1994-Jan. 9, 1995), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; General
Social Survey accession no. 192100 (Feb.-Apr. 1991), available at LEXIS, News and
Business, RPOLL File; Center for Political Studies accession no. 211923 (Nov. 8, 1988-Jan.
30, 1989), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File; Gallup Organization
accession no. 25761 (Jan. 10-13, 1986), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.

A survey of a national sample of adults in the United States in 1965 measured the strength
of attitudes toward state legislation that allows employees to choose whether to join a union
(popularly labeled “right-to-work” legislation). Only one in four Americans was neutral on
the issue — just 15% of the respondents expressed “little or no concern” with such legislation,
and an additional 11% had “no opinion” on the legislation. On the other hand, “very strong
concern” with the legislation was expressed by 38%, and “a fair amount of concern” was
expressed by an additional 36%. Opinion Research Corp. accession no. 101530 (Nov. 22-Dec.
10, 1965), available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File. Right-to-work legislation,
given the number of questions asked about it in public opinion polls, was evidently a salient
subject to Americans during most of the last half of the twentieth century. See Public Opinion
Online, available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File. The legislation is viewed as
having been accompanied by important economic change. Eric Tucker, “Great Expectations”
Defeated?: The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States
Post-NAFTA, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 106 (2004).
Approximately two-thirds of all adults in the United States in 2001 felt “strongly” about
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, i.e., either “strongly” favored or
“strongly” opposed the decision, which established for women a constitutional right to an
abortion. Los Angeles Times accession no. 381074 (March 3-5, 2001), available at LEXIS,
News and Business, RPOLL File; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
These topics, in short, are significant to society. As a result, they can be expected to
spawn important social products — in particular, symbols. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 82124.
65

Kevin B. Smith, Explaining Variation in State-Level Homicide Rates: Does Crime
Policy Pay?, 59 J. POL. 350, 355, 360-61 (1997). The most recent rigorous study of the death
penalty, which used annual data on counties for the period 1977 through 1996, found that the
impact of capital punishment differed between states and that executions, while reducing the
number of murders in some states, increased the number of murders or had no effect in other
states. When the effects in all of the states were aggregated, the net number of murders that
executions were estimated to have prevented in 1977-1996 was roughly 1,672. Joanna M.
Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among
States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 232 (2005). During the twenty years covered by the study,
however, the number of murders in the United States totaled 427,600. Calculated from U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at table 263
(108th ed. 1987), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html; U.S. BUREAU
th
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at table 335 (108 ed.
1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html.
Consequently,
executions between 1977 and 1996 reduced the number of murders that would have occurred
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nonagricultural workers who are union members,66 or on the percentage of
pregnancies that women choose to terminate.67
The second type of law that does not emphasize appearances but is symbolic is
law that merely expresses dominant values of the society. Law of this type does not
directly regulate activity but, rather, affirms salient social ideals, and it is illustrated
by the federal Defense of Marriage Act. The pertinent provision of the Act permits
states and other U.S. jurisdictions (territories, possessions and Indian tribes) to deny
recognition to same-sex marriages from another jurisdiction even though the
marriages are lawful in the latter.68 The Act endorses both the traditional conception
of marriage (and its associated gender roles69) and the longstanding authority of

in these years by 1,672/(427,600 + 1,672) = 1,672/429,272 = 0.00389 x 100 = 0.389%, i.e., by
approximately four-tenths of one percent.
In addition, statutes establishing prison sentences for criminal conduct have a negligible
influence on the overall rate of major crimes. Tomislav V. Kovandzic, The Impact of
Florida’s Habitual Offender Law on Crime, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 179 (2001); Thomas B. Marvell
& Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies Committed with
Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247 (1995); Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, “Three Strikes
and You’re Out”: The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious
Crime Rates, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1997); Tamasak Witayapanyanon, Criminal Justice
Policy in the United States: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Sentencing Reform Acts 211212, 223-224 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University) (on file
with Widener University Library).
66
Keith Lumsden & Craig Petersen, The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in
the United States, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1237 (1975). Because union membership in a state is not
materially affected by whether a right-to-work statute has been adopted in the state, such
statutes and their political precursors are “symbol rather than substance.” Id. at 1248.
67
Social science research has found that the legalization of abortion in the United States
had no more than a small impact on the aggregate number of births in the nation as a whole
and in individual states. Timothy D. Hogan, An Intervention Analysis of the Effects of
Legalized Abortion Upon U.S. Fertility, 3 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 201, 214-215
(1984). The legalization of abortion is also estimated to have had a small effect on the average
number of lifetime births per woman. Jacob Alex Klerman, U.S. Abortion Policy and
Fertility, 89 AM. ECON. REV., May 1999, at 261, 264. Among white women, the reduction in
lifetime fertility was found to be less than 3.0%. Calculated from id. at table 1. The absence
of a major impact on white women is notable because white women comprised the vast
majority of all women who were in their childbearing years during and following the period
when abortion law changed. In 1970 and 1980, for example, white females were
approximately 87% and 85%, respectively, of all females residing in the United States who
were age 15 to 44. Calculated from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
rd
THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83 (103
ed. 1982), at table 31, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/ abs/statab1951-1994.htm.

The preceding studies, in supporting the conclusion that U.S. law on abortion has
minimally influenced the proportion of pregnancies that are intentionally interrupted, suggest
that such law serves chiefly as a symbol.
68

28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).

69

See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 187, 196.
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states to define marriage.70 Indeed, an express purpose of the Act was to affirm state
sovereignty over marriage so that a state can, if it chooses, exclude from the status of
marriage couples comprised of individuals of the same sex.71 Because the Act
merely recognizes the existing authority of states to regulate marriage rather than
altering that authority, the Act is purely symbolic.72
In the present article, however, I concentrate on appearances that a phenomenon
is present, and I contend that law dealing with appearances of a socially salient
phenomenon is symbolic. Although not all law applies to such appearances, some
law probably must do so. Why do these appearances become the subject of law?
The answer is that attitudes and behaviors toward a group (including an institution)73
are shaped by beliefs regarding whether the group acts in a just manner,74 and these
beliefs are molded by appearances. Thus, although jurisprudence and scholarship on
it have long distinguished “substance” from “form”75 and often expressed a
preference for substance over form,76 the appearances generated by the form of
judicial proceedings have been recognized as a factor that affects the trust of the
public in the institution of law.77
In sum, appearances of phenomena that are important to a social system give
symbolism to law addressing the appearances, and the symbols of law aid a society
in securing the commitment of its participants.78 For every group, of course, the
commitment of its participants is vital, because to the extent that participant
commitment is lacking, the ability of a group to operate smoothly and effectively
will be hampered.79 If a society is to benefit from an institution, moreover, the

70

H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.

71

Id., at 2-3, 25, 27, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906, 2907, 2929, 2931.

72

Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights
of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1385 (2005).
73
Since the word “group” is employed here to refer to an organized set of individuals, an
institution is a type of group.
74

Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social Movements, in HANDBOOK
supra note 41, at 595, 595, 606, 611-612.

OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
75

E.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573 (1840).

76

E.g., John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law,
36 HOUS. L. REV. 397, 462 (1999); Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free
Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 372 (1991).
77

United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

78

See CERULO, supra note 9, at 15-27. The promotion of societal cohesion is among the
goals sought to be achieved by government in regulating the physical appearance of
individuals. See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1974).
Government regulation of individuals’ physical appearance is discussed earlier in this article.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79

Levine & Moreland, supra note 41, at 428; Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Work Group
Demography, Social Integration, and Turnover, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 21, 33-34 (1989). See
Wayne Busby, Social Integration and Community Health 79-81, 86 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Univ. of Oklahoma); Sung-Soon Clara Kim, Dimensions of Social Integration:
Solidarity and Deviance in American Cities 142-148 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
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institution must be perceived as fair, i.e., as just. The institution of law has
acknowledged the necessity of perceptions of fairness: in the words of the United
States Supreme Court, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”80
As defined in this article, a symbol is a stimulus that is visible, audible, or
touchable and that represents a thing that is of significance to society; such stimuli
include appearances that society deems important. Two illustrations of the
symbolism of appearances and of pertinent law may be helpful. First, American
ideals require a substantial distance between the institution of government and the
institution of religion,81 a requirement that is embodied in the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.82 Consequently, appearances
that powers of government are being shared with religious entities have been found
by the United States Supreme Court to constitute symbols that implicate (and
violate) the First Amendment.83 As a second illustration, certain physical attributes
of individuals generate reactions by others,84 and one of the attributes that does so is
body hair. Numerous cultures specify the manner of dealing with body hair,85 and in
the United States, the social definition of females and males involves unequivocal
sex-based differences as to the management of hair. For instance, “[t]he gender
norm that says that women’s skin should be smooth and bare (and the social
opprobrium that accordingly rains down on any woman who goes unshaven)”
contribute to sex-based differences in grooming.86 Body hair, being a factor in the
appearances of gender, is symbolic because it is linked to social roles and thus is
University of Virginia) (on file with Widener University Library); Thorolfur Thorlindsson &
Jón Gunnar Bernburg, Durkheim’s Theory of Social Order and Deviance: a Multi-level Test,
20 EUR. SOC. REV. 271 (2004). See also Uberto Gatti et al., Civic Community and Juvenile
Delinquency, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 22 (2003) (data analysis consistent with an inverse
relationship between degree of social integration and incidence of the most serious violent
crimes). Cf. Thomas A. Petee et al., Levels of Social Integration in Group Contexts and the
Effects of Informal Sanction Threat on Deviance, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 85 (1994) (concluding that
the ability of informal sanctions to prevent illegal behavior rises with the degree of social
integration in a group).
80
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955).
81

In 2002, for example, a survey of a national sample of adults in the United States found
that eight out of ten respondents “completely” or “mostly” agreed with the statement that
“Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.”
Pew Research Center accession no. 431836 (Aug. 19-Sept. 8, 2002), available at LEXIS,
News and Business, RPOLL File.
82
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. These provisions also apply to the states and
their subdivisions. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Gordon, 542 U.S. 1, 8 & n.4 (2004).
83

Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696-97 (1994). See also Doe v. Shenandoah
County Sch. Bd., 737 F. Supp. 913, 918 (W.D. Va. 1990).
84

See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

85

Deborah Pergament, It's Not Just Hair: Historical and Cultural Considerations for an
Emerging Technology, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41 (1999).
86

Louise M. Antony, Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us About Equality,
9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7 (1998).
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significant to society. In terms of law, constitutional and statutory doctrines have
arisen from sex distinctions in the policies of government entities and private
employers regarding the length of head hair,87 and through stimulus generalization,
these doctrines have become symbols.
In concluding part II, let me identify the key points that underlie the
macrosociological perspective I am proposing. A society, to operate effectively,
must have the commitment of its participants generally, but such commitment
requires that the participants trust the institutions of their society and regard the
institutions as fair.88 Otherwise expressed, a society will be viable to the extent its
participants believe that the institutions of the society provide social justice.89 Given
that the content of law is a response to the recognized needs and dominant values of
society,90 the concepts and doctrines of law, and the definitions of social justice that
they advance,91 undergo change when societal conditions are altered.92
The present article, in focusing on concepts and doctrines of law that operate as
symbols, contends that the bond between a society and its participants is
strengthened by law that is symbolic. The symbols of law strengthen the bond
because they incorporate established notions of social justice and “[a]ppearance—
symbolism—is critical in any system of justice.”93 The concepts and doctrines of
law, then, aid society by their symbolism, and they are symbolic when, inter alia,
they are applied to appearances of socially significant phenomena because the
symbolism of the latter is, through stimulus generalization, acquired by law.
From a macrosociological perspective, then, the fact that law is an institution of
society is not attributable to the efforts of particular individuals or due to mere

87

Pergament, supra note 85, at 52-54, 56. See also Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)Lawfully
Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2005)
(discussing sex-based head hair grooming policies as part of “appearance discrimination”
generally and labeling court decisions and statutes on appearance discrimination as
“appearance law”).
88

See Joel Brockner et al., The Influence of Prior Commitment to an Institution on
Reactions to Perceived Unfairness: The Higher They Are, The Harder They Fall, 37 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 241 (1992) [hereinafter Brockner I]; Joel Brockner et al., When Trust Matters: The
Moderating Effect of Outcome Favorability, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 558 (1997).
89

Instances of perceived social injustice evidently reduce commitment to a group among
participants who are strongly committed, but instances of perceived social justice do not seem
to increase commitment among participants who are weakly committed. Consequently, “it
may be much easier to break, rather than build[,] . . . organizational commitment.” Brockner
I, supra note 88, at 260.
90

BARNETT, supra note 3, at 16-19.

91

In this regard, the English jurist William Blackstone was correct in his observation that
“[l]aw is the embodiment of the moral sentiment of the people.” CLASSIC QUOTES, The
Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
92

Collins v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare & Ret. Fund, 298 F. Supp. 964, 968 (D.
D.C. 1969), aff’d, 439 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 944
(Vt. 1985); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 34 P.2d 311, 313 (Or. 1934).
93

Eugene R. Fidell, The Culture of Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L. REV. 125, 132
(1989).
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coincidence. Instead, law is an institution because, as a servant rather than a master
of society,94 it benefits the social system. This benefit is supplied partially through
symbols, a mechanism that permits the existence of widespread interpersonal
relationships and, hence, social life.
III. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF THE OCCUPATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISER
A statute enacted by a legislature may not on its face encompass appearances, but
through interpretation by courts and administrative agencies, it may be extended to
appearances. The application of law to appearances, therefore, may not be obvious
and easily ascertained; instead, whether appearances have been brought within the
scope of a statute may be determinable only from documents construing the statute.
To illustrate this point, I will use the occupation of investment adviser and, in
particular, the definition of the occupation under federal law.
The topic
demonstrates the often-subtle role of appearances in law.95
Congress has defined the occupation of “investment adviser” in both the
Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”), but the
definition in the former Act is concerned exclusively with the parties furnishing
recommendations to investment companies regarding the acquisition and/or
disposition of securities by the companies.96 The definition in the Advisers Act
contains no such limitation. Specifically, section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act
declares an investment adviser to be
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.97
Subject to certain exceptions, a person satisfying this definition (“Advisers Act
definition”) must register with, and conform to applicable rules of, the Securities and
Exchange Commission if the person uses the mail system or any channel of interstate
commerce in the United States to engage in business as an investment adviser.98

94

See George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1971) (referring to the
“ever changing conditions of the society which the law is intended to serve.”).
95

See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 299 (N.J. 1985) (state statute regulating
employment in casinos must be “concerned not only with impropriety, but also with its
appearance, which is always more subtle than impropriety itself.”).
96

15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (2000). A party supplying securities advice will not be an
investment adviser under the Investment Company Act unless the entity receiving the advice
qualifies as an investment company. The statutory criteria for an investment company are in
section 3 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3.
97

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). A “person” is either “a natural person or a company”; a
company includes “a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust,
or any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not . . . .” Id. §§ 80b-2(a)(5), 80b2(a)(16).
98

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a).
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The discussion below will focus solely on the Advisers Act definition, because
this definition is applicable to a much larger number of persons—and is therefore of
much greater practical importance—than the definition of investment adviser in the
Investment Company Act. Any investment adviser under the latter Act will be an
investment adviser under the Advisers Act,99 but an investment adviser under the
Advisers Act may not be an investment adviser under the Investment Company Act
because a person meeting the Advisers Act definition of investment adviser can
serve clients that are not investment companies. As a result, investment advisers
under the Advisers Act are responsible for the securities portfolios of not just
investment companies (e.g., mutual funds) but of other clients as well, and all of the
securities portfolios they manage have a combined market value that far exceeds the
market value of the securities portfolios of investment companies.100
Why is the occupation of investment adviser of social significance in the United
States? The answer may not be immediately obvious inasmuch as the products with
which investment advisers work (viz., securities) are, on the surface, economic in
character. Nonetheless, the occupation of investment adviser has important
implications for American society. Economic matters can have major social
consequences,101 and in the case of investment advisers, such consequences are
unavoidable because the occupation directly affects a large portion of the public.
Specifically, in 2005, close to one-half (47.5%) of all households in the United States
owned shares of at least one mutual fund (the most common form of investment
company); the households that owned mutual fund shares had an investment in a
median of four funds and had a median of 47% of their financial assets in the
funds.102
An examination of the definition of investment adviser in the Advisers Act
reveals that the definition encompasses more than a single type of activity.
Specifically, the definition designates as an investment adviser “any person who”
(italics added), employs the word “who” not once but twice, and precedes the second
“who” with the word “or.” Each “who” is accompanied by a description of a set of
activities, moreover, and the descriptions differ markedly in their wording. Given

99
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); Cornelius C. Rose Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1978 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 360, at *2 (Jan. 6, 1978).
100

See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA2059, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,841 (Sept. 26, 2002). The Release estimates the market value of
portfolios over which investment advisers under the Advisers Act have discretionary authority
to be approximately $19 trillion. Id. The Release also reports the market value of the
portfolios of mutual funds, i.e., of open-end management investment companies. 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-4, 80a-5 (2000). Data are evidently for the end of 2001. At that time, the net assets of
mutual funds amounted to $6.97 trillion, while the other common forms of investment
companies—closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts—had assets
worth, respectively, $141 billion, $83 billion, and $49 billion. INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, 2006 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 71, 81-83 (46th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2006_factbook.pdf.
101

Caroline Hodges Persell, The Interdependence of Social Justice and Civil Society, 12
SOC. F. 149 (1997).
102

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 100, at 47-48.
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the significance of individual words in a statute,103 two separate classes of activity
are within the scope of the definition of investment adviser in section 202(a)(11).
The subject of both classes, however, is conduct that is business in nature.
Although one class of activity under the Advisers Act definition involves a
“business” and the other class involves a “regular business,” the Division of
Investment Management (“Division”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission
has taken the position that the business element of the definition has the same
character in each of the two classes of activity comprising the occupation of
investment adviser as defined in section 202(a)(11).104 Regardless of whether the
Division is correct in this regard, the concept of “business” is basic to the definition.
Accordingly, there must be a “business” that supplies investment advice, or furnishes
reports or analyses, regarding securities, and the fundamental attributes of a business
inhere in every type of advisory service provided. But what are these attributes?
One of the attributes that can place a person in the investment advisory business,
according to the Division, is “hold[ing] himself out as an investment adviser or as
one who provides investment advice.”105 Notably, the “[h]olding oneself out”
attribute also has a bearing at other points in the definition of investment adviser in
section 202(a)(11). For example, the section excludes lawyers, accountants,
engineers, and teachers from the definition of investment adviser when their
investment advice “is solely incidental to the practice of [their] profession,”106 and
the staff has concluded that the exclusion is unavailable to any of the designated
professionals who holds herself/himself out publicly as an investment adviser.107
Similarly, section 202(a)(11) excludes brokers and dealers from the definition of
investment adviser if inter alia they supply investment advice in a manner that is
“solely incidental” to their broker-dealer business.108 This exclusion, under a
Commission rule, is unavailable when a broker or dealer, in furnishing advice that is
a component of a financial plan or that is related to financial planning, “holds itself
out generally to the public as a financial planner or as providing financial planning
services.”109 Brokers and dealers that, in the context of a comprehensive analysis of

103

2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES

AND

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (6th ed.

2000).
104
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component
of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-1092, 52 Fed. Reg.
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Release No. IA-1092].
105
Id. Investment advising is not the only occupation of which an individual can be
deemed a member when the individual holds himself or herself out as being in the occupation.
Thus, the ethical rules governing attorneys have been applied to an individual who, although
not admitted to the bar, presented himself as an attorney. Triffin v. DiSalvo, 643 A.2d 118
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 661 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1995).
106

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B) (2000).

107

Release No. IA-1092, supra note 104, at 38,403. Accord, Hungerford, Aldrin, Nichols
& Carter, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1420, at *2-3 (Dec. 10, 1991).
108

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2000).

109

Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. IA-2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,454 (April 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17
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the long-term financial requirements of a client, supply advice about securities to the
client will not be doing so in connection with their brokerage business when they
have portrayed themselves as engaged in investment advising.110 Any appearance of
being an investment adviser, accordingly, renders these brokers and dealers
ineligible for the statutory exclusion from the definition of investment adviser and
triggers the status of investment adviser.
In short, the “hold oneself out” standard is a recurring aspect of section
202(a)(11). That the standard is not uncommon in the definition of investment
adviser may be traceable to section 203 of the Advisers Act. Paragraph (a) of section
203 mandates registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of an
investment adviser that employs mail or interstate commerce “in connection with his
or its business.”111 However, paragraph (b)(3) of the section exempts from
registration inter alia an investment adviser who has had no more than fourteen
clients in the prior twelve months, who is not an investment adviser to an investment
company that is registered with the Commission under the Investment Company Act,
and who does not “hold[] himself out generally to the public as an investment
adviser.”112 Thus, the “hold oneself out” standard is explicitly embedded in the
Advisers Act.
To hold out a thing as existing, of course, generates appearances of the thing.113
For investment advisory services, a wide range of actions can hold out an entity or
individual as an investment adviser and produce appearances that the services are
offered by a business. For example, an entity will evidently be deemed to have held
itself out publicly as being in the investment advisory business if the entity has an
office in a building whose directory not only lists the name of the entity but also
identifies the entity as an “investment adviser.”114 Furthermore, an entity that
C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-1(b)); Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment
Advisers, Extension of Compliance Date, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2426,
2005 SEC LEXIS 2343 (Sept. 12, 2005).
110

Sec. Indus. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 853, at *2-3 (Dec.
16, 2005).
111

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2000).

112

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). Section 203(b)(3) does not exclude a person from the
definition of investment adviser but permits a person qualifying as an investment adviser to
conduct an investment advisory business through mail and interstate commerce without
registering with the Commission.
113

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958) (creation of apparent
authority); Andrews v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979) (imposition
of liability on successor corporations for acts of their predecessor corporations).
114

Mr. Bate, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 847, at *2 (June 28, 1988).
The reply of the staff in this case dealt with section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, the
pertinent portion of which is discussed in the prior paragraph in the text. The staff seems to
consider the activities that comprise “holding out” under section 203(b)(3) to be the same
activities that comprise “holding out” under the exclusions from the definition of investment
adviser in section 202(a)(11). See George J. Dippold, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 748, at *4 (May 7, 1990). It is logical to presume, therefore, that these activities
are also applicable to and determinative of the business element in the definition of investment
adviser in section 202(a)(11).
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furnishes recommendations to a bank regarding securities for the portfolio of a
common fund operated by the bank as a trustee, executor, administrator or guardian
will be holding itself out publicly as an investment adviser if (i) current or
prospective participants in the fund are supplied with information they request about
the entity and its significant personnel and investment strategies, (ii) meetings to
discuss these matters are conducted with the officers of the entity at the request of
current and prospective participants, and (iii) even one or two conferences, attended
by representatives of the entity, are arranged each year by the bank for current and
prospective participants.115 In short, persons recommending securities for purchase
and/or sale will hold themselves out as investment advisers unless investmentpertinent information about and from them is restricted.116 If these persons are not
circumspect in making available such information, they may appear to be offering
investment advice to potential clients and, therefore, may be required to register with
the Commission as investment advisers.
Let me return to a point made earlier. Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act
encompasses two types of activity, each of which involves a business. According to
the section as written, however, one type of activity entails just a “business” while
the other type entails a “regular business.” The Division of Investment Management
perceives no difference between a “business” and a “regular business,”117 but in
terms of appearances, there seems to be a significant distinction.
The terms “business” and “regular business” are found not only in the Advisers
Act but also in the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”), and their presence in
the latter Act is instructive. Specifically, the Exchange Act designates as a “dealer”
any party involved in a “business” of acquiring and disposing of securities for the
personal account of the party, but the Act explicitly excludes a party from the status
of dealer when the securities transactions do not comprise a “regular business” of the
party.118 The word “business” by itself—i.e., even when unaccompanied by the word
“regular”—“connotes a certain regularity of participation in purchasing and selling
activities rather than a few isolated transactions.”119 Accordingly, a business comes
into existence when, inter alia, an activity that is motivated largely by economic
factors recurs with a frequency that surpasses a threshold—a threshold that is
determined by judgment and not merely by numbers.120 However, Congress chose to
include in two securities statutes not only the term “business” but also the term
“regular business,” and it placed the terms in close proximity to one another.
Congress must be presumed to have viewed the terms as having different referents

115

Resource Bank & Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 624 (Mar.
29, 1991).
116
See Thomson Financial, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,318, at 78,517 (July 9, 2002), available at 2002 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 635.
117

Release No. IA-1092, supra note 104.

118

15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(5)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).

119

LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 6 SECURITIES REGULATION 2980 (3d ed. 1990).

120

InTouch Global, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 846, at *6
(Nov. 14, 1995). The differences between a business and a profession are discussed in
Barnett, supra note 35, at 170-171, 173-178.
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and wanted them distinguished, because in construing a securities statute, “we must
give effect to every word that Congress used.”121
What differentiates a “business” from a “regular business”? Since the terms are
not defined in either Act, they were evidently intended by Congress to convey the
meanings they possess in everyday discourse.122 The obvious difference between the
terms, of course, is that a “regular business” occurs more often than a “business,”
and this difference has ramifications for appearances. Specifically, a business that
appears to be regular would generally be viewed as entailing activity of greater
frequency than a business that lacks the appearance of regularity, and inaccurate
appearances seem more likely to be due to malevolent intent or gross negligence
when their referent is a “regular” business than when it is a “mere” business.
What is the implication of this point for the Advisers Act? The Act was designed
to protect the public from fraud and manipulation123 and thus requires advisers to
disclose conflicts of interest so that the public will believe securities markets are fair
and will make the investments necessary for economic growth.124 The Securities and
Exchange Commission may advance these goals more effectively if it distinguishes a
regular business from a business that is not regular and, when dealing with
appearances of them, focuses more on inaccurate appearances of a regular business.
Inaccurate appearances of any activity are capable of injuring the public, of course,
but some types of inaccurate appearances undoubtedly can harm the social fabric
more frequently and more severely than other types. Appearances influence the
operation of the society in which they are found, and all else being equal,
appearances that are erroneous may reduce trust and undermine social life more
when they are associated with an activity (business) that is perceived as regular than
when they are associated with an activity (business) that is perceived as not regular,
because the exploitation of others is probably the principal motivation for inaccurate
appearances of a regular activity.125
Additionally, as the Advisers Act definition makes plain, securities are at the
heart of the occupation of investment advising. Appearances of a regular investment
advisory business are likely to entail a larger number of explicit references to
securities in communications with potential investors than appearances of a nonregular investment advisory business. At the same time, whether an instrument
constitutes a security as a matter of law depends in part on its characterization by the
promoter or seller, and an instrument is more likely to be deemed a security if it has

121
Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 208 n.53 (1985). This principle is
discussed in Singer, supra note 103.
122

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).

123

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 189-191 (1963).
124

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 201.

125

Cf. In re Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 539 (1965), available at 1965 SEC LEXIS 792
(registration of corporate investment adviser revoked because adviser inter alia had willfully
and erroneously implied in advertising material that it was a long-established organization and
that it possessed a substantial staff with extensive experience in investment securities).
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been presented to investors as a security.126 Logically, therefore, characterizations of
an instrument as a security that are incorrect due to recklessness or fraud will occur
most commonly with an investment adviser whose business appears to be regular.
The cumulative impact of such incorrect characterizations can only impair trust in
the financial sector of the economy and weaken the cohesiveness of society.
IV. THE APPEARANCE-OF-IMPROPRIETY STANDARD FOR ATTORNEY CONDUCT
This article rests on the macrosociological proposition that the concepts and
doctrines of law, partly if not chiefly by being symbols, in the long run promote
participants’ commitment to, and hence strengthen, the social order. Like all
scientific propositions, the proposition that law furnishes symbols supporting the
social system is empirically testable, albeit indirectly. The proposition is based on
the related assumptions that concepts and doctrines of law are responses to
identifiable properties of society; that, being responses to societal properties,
concepts and doctrines of law are suitable for the properties responsible for them;
and that the responses are manifested in measurable relationships between the
concepts and doctrines, on the one hand, and the societal properties, on the other.127
The proposition and the assumptions behind it necessarily follow from the
conceptualization of a society as a system.128 By definition, a system is organized,
and organization is the antithesis of randomness.129 Therefore, the concepts and
doctrines of law as an institution of society can be expected not to occur randomly
but to be tied to conditions in the system. I report below the results of a study that
examines whether societal properties predict the use by states of a specific symbolic
concept and doctrine in defining ethical standards for attorneys.
A. Model Ethical Standards Promulgated by the American Bar Association
Explicit standards for the behavior of attorneys were initially adopted by the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) during the first decade of the twentieth
century.130 However, not until the third decade of the twentieth century do any ABA
documents exhibit a concern with the appearances that the actions of attorneys

126

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66, 68-69 (1990). In law, even an instrument that does not
exist may be regarded as a security if its promoters have portrayed it as a security. In re EuroAtlantic Securities, Inc., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9402 (Feb. 25,
2000), 2000 SEC LEXIS 326, at *52-53 .
127

See John W. Mohr, Measuring Meaning Structures, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 345 (1998).

128

See JOHN SCOTT, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 138-139 (1995); Kim, supra note 79, at 9-28,
142-151.
129
Dictionary definitions of the word “system” include “[a] set or assemblage of things
connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of
parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan.” 17 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 496 (2nd ed. 1989).
130

James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2395 (2003).
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generate, and the focus at this time was on attorneys in limited types of situations.131
In 1969, the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(“Model Code”),132 and under the Code, all attorneys were instructed to “avoid even
the appearance of impropriety.”133 The admonition was evidently intended to build
trust in the institution of law134 and to promote a belief in the fairness of the
institution.135 Being an institution, law is by definition of major social significance,
and given the prominence of law among the professions,136 so is the work of
attorneys and judges. Accordingly, the ethical standards applied by the institution to
appearances generated by its professionals operate as symbols in society.137
In specifying ethical requirements for attorneys, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”), which were released by the ABA in 1982,138 omitted the
appearance-of-impropriety standard139 on the ground that the standard was
ambiguous.140 Nonetheless, the ABA applies the standard to judges—and has done
so since 1924 when it approved the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Canon 4 in the 1924
formulation required, inter alia, that “[a] judge’s official conduct should be free from
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”141 In 1972, this canon became the
131
Edward C. Brewer, III, Some Thoughts on the Process of Making Ethics Rules,
Including How to Make the “Appearance of Impropriety” Disappear, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 321,
323-24 (2003).
132

Id. at 324.

133

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981).

134

Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992).
135

Brown v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 n.4 (Nev. 2000).

136

A measure of the relative importance to society of law as a profession is the number of
Juris Doctor and/or Bachelor of Laws degrees in relation to the total number of firstprofessional degrees. Degrees in law comprised between roughly four and five out of every
ten first-professional degrees awarded from the 1965-66 academic year to the 2000-01
academic year. Calculated at five-year intervals from 1965-66 to 2000-01 using data in the
following sources: Am. Bar Ass’n, Legal Education and Bar Admission Statistics, 1963-2005,
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/le_bastats.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2006); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003, at table
249 (2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2005025
[hereinafter DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003].
137

See William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of SelfRegulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 619-621 (1995).
138

Brewer, supra note 131, at 324.

139

However, the Model Rules explicitly bar attorneys from publicly holding themselves
out as admitted to practice in jurisdictions where they are not members of the Bar. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2003). The Rules, therefore, continue to prohibit
appearances of one type.
140

Brewer, supra note 131, at 324-25.

141

AM. BAR ASS’N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED 29, 30 (1936).
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basis of Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.142 Canon 2 stated that “A
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the
Judge’s Activities,” and the same wording was employed in the 1990 version of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.143 The persistence over eight decades of the
appearance-of-impropriety standard for judges is notable, for it is an implicit
concession that appearances mold the public’s view of the institution of law. Indeed,
the importance to the institution of appearances does not seem to have been disputed
in formulating the Model Rules. The appearance-of-impropriety standard was
abandoned in the Model Rules because it was thought to be incapable of consistent,
non-invidious application rather than because appearances are irrelevant to the social
standing of the institution of law.144
Even though the most recent paradigm of ethical standards for attorneys
promulgated by the American Bar Association does not include an explicit
appearance-of-impropriety test, an indicator of the importance to society of
appearances of ethical behavior is that, during the last two decades of the twentieth
century, a widespread concern with appearances of unethical conduct existed in the
United States.145 The concern cannot be dismissed as a sociological fortuity. On the
contrary, the concern may be unavoidable in a society that possesses a large
population and a complex economy, because complete information about others is
difficult to procure in such a setting.146 Accordingly, appearances of ethical conduct
and appearances of unethical conduct by participants in a group are commonly
understood to affect the degree of trust that prevails in the group.147 Moreover,
appearances have been acknowledged as a factor that shapes the reputation of the
judiciary and the police,148 and appearances thus affect the reputation of the
institution of law itself. Because trust and reputation—two social outputs that are
critical to every group149—are influenced by appearances of ethical behavior and
appearances of unethical behavior, American society places considerable emphasis
on these appearances.
To ascertain whether symbolic concepts and doctrines of law are reactions to
societal conditions, I report below the results of a study that examined the use by
states of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for the conduct of attorneys. The
Model Code, which incorporated the standard, and the Model Rules, which omitted
142

LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 13 (1992).

143

AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 29 (2004).

144

See Morgan, supra note 134, at 602-03, 616-17.

145

MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 40, at 2-5.

146

See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS 126 (1995) (“[A]ppearances are usually
the only window that citizens have on official conduct.”).
147

E.g., Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
1108, 1126 (1995); Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of
Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 177 (2003).
148
E.g., In re Complaint of Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (Ore. 1990) (judiciary); Auburn
Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 902 (1st Cir. 1993) (law enforcement officers and
associations).
149

Barnett, supra note 4, at 814-21, 825-27.
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the standard, are simply proposals of the American Bar Association. The standards
of ethics that govern an attorney are set and enforced by the particular state in which
the attorney practices. Moreover, a state that declines to formulate its own standards
but bases its ethical standards on the Model Code or Model Rules is not obligated to
adopt verbatim the content of either; states have often modified the Model Code and
Model Rules.150 In addition, the courts in a state through case law can alter the
ethical standards of the state without revising the wording of the standards.
Consequently, although by 2005 the Model Rules were in effect (albeit with
modifications) in 45 states and the District of Columbia,151 neither the Model Rules
nor the Model Code by themselves can be assumed to disclose accurately the current
ethical standards that are applied to attorneys in a jurisdiction. Rather, both the
codified standards of a state and the opinions of the highest court of the state
determine whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard is being used.
B. Research Design
In mid-2005, I undertook a state-by-state review to ascertain whether, as of that
time, the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys either was an explicit
provision of the written ethical requirements of the state or had been employed by
the highest court of the state after the Model Rules (or modified version thereof)
were adopted by the state. Given that the purpose of my research was to identify
societal properties that generally foster or hinder acceptance of the standard by
states, I wanted to minimize the possibility that properties unique to a state could
influence the findings, and I therefore did not include the two states (Alaska and
Hawaii) that are geographically distant from the coterminous United States. Of the
remaining 48 states, four were excluded because I was unable to determine with
certainty whether they currently utilized the appearance-of-impropriety standard.152
The data analysis reported below is thus limited to 44 states.153 Twenty-six of the
states were found to be applying the standard to attorneys as of mid-2005,154 and
eighteen of the states were found not to be applying the standard to attorneys.155
Four system-level properties were identified a priori as potential influences on
whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard would be employed by a state. The
properties were cultural heterogeneity, population concentration, social system
150

STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 4 (7th ed.

2005).
151

Id.

152
The four states excluded for this reason were Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and
Washington.
153

In order to confine the study to states, the District of Columbia was omitted from the
statistical analysis.
154

The twenty-six states applying the standard were Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
155
The eighteen states not applying the standard were Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia.
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rationality, and societal stability. The level of each property seemed, on logical
grounds, to be capable of affecting the likelihood that a state would accept the
standard, as I explain below. The explanation is based on the assumption that, as to
each property, all else is equal.
Cultural heterogeneity. Logically, a culture characterized by diversity could be
inhospitable to explicit prohibitions on appearances of impropriety because the
culture may lack a prerequisite for these prohibitions. That prerequisite is a
substantial body of common values, which may be needed for general agreement on
conduct that is to be regarded as improper. Without such agreement, bans on
appearances of impropriety may not be adopted. However, an alternative and
opposing prediction is possible. Specifically, a high level of cultural heterogeneity
could facilitate the adoption of an explicit ban on appearances of impropriety and
make such bans more frequent, because the ban can provide culturally diverse groups
with a common focal point and thereby promote their commitment to the social
system.
Population concentration. A high level of population concentration could increase
the frequency of an express ban on appearances of impropriety. Logic suggests that,
when population density is high, appearances of improper conduct will be noticed by
a larger percentage of the population. On this reasoning, a densely populated society
will benefit more than a sparsely populated society from an explicit ban on such
appearances and is more likely to accept the appearance-of-impropriety standard.
Alternatively, however, a high level of population concentration logically can reduce
the need for, and the incidence of, explicit prohibitions on appearances of
impropriety because informal, interpersonal pressures may be more common as
population density rises. In settings where numerous people are present, appearances
of impropriety may be suppressed informally and an official proscription may be
unnecessary.
Social system rationality. Logically, an express ban on appearances of impropriety
is not required to the extent a population recognizes the importance of avoiding such
appearances. Such recognition presumably results from rationality. A high level of
rationality in a society,156 then, could reduce the need for the appearance-ofimpropriety standard and make the standard less likely. On the other hand, the
opposite could happen. Specifically, insofar as rationality in a society fosters
awareness of the social problems created by appearances of impropriety, explicit
bans on these appearances could become more acceptable and, in turn, more
frequent.
Societal stability. On logical grounds, a stable social system could require fewer
symbols because commitment to the system is high, and law that explicitly bans
appearances of impropriety could therefore be needed less in a stable than in an
unstable system. However, the opposite is logically possible, too. A stable social
system could have a larger number and variety of symbols than an unstable system
because social values, including those that underlie the symbols, do not change as
much and/or as often in a stable system. Therefore, with greater societal stability,
law may more often prohibit appearances of impropriety.

156
The level of rationality in a society is probably an effect of the degree to which the
society produces and uses sophisticated knowledge and disseminates that knowledge to its
participants through the education institution.
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In short, logic furnishes a basis for linking all four system-level properties to the
appearance-of-impropriety standard; i.e., in principle, each property is capable of
affecting the likelihood the standard will be present in a state. However, as the
preceding discussion reveals, a prediction cannot be made as to whether this
likelihood is raised or lowered by growth or intensification of a given property.
The necessity of relying on logic, and the inability to predict the direction of
change in the likelihood of the appearance-of-impropriety standard, stem from the
current, inadequate level of social science knowledge of law as an institution. The
study reported here attempts to contribute to a research-based sociological theory
that deals with the existence and nature of the links between the system-level
properties identified above, on the one hand, and doctrines of law, on the other. If a
society is a system—i.e., if the components of society do not operate haphazardly—
the symbols of law do not develop fortuitously, and a relationship can be expected to
exist between one or more of the properties discussed above and the appearance-ofimpropriety standard for attorneys.
In order to ascertain the relationship, if any, between the properties and the
adoption by states of the appearance-of-impropriety standard, the properties must be
empirically measured. Because the properties are potential building blocks for a
sociological theory of law, their conceptualization is necessarily abstract, and each
property must be represented in the statistical analysis by a variable that
quantitatively and accurately captures the property. Table 1 provides descriptions, as
well as the mnemonic labels, of the variables that were utilized in the regression
model as indicators of the properties. The indicator variable corresponding to each
property was as follows:
System-level property

Indicator (mnemonic label)

Cultural heterogeneity
Population concentration
Social system rationality
Societal stability

FOREIGNPOP
METROPOP
COLLEGERATE
CRIMERATE

For cultural heterogeneity in a state, an obvious indicator is the percentage of the
population of the state that was born outside the United States, and for population
concentration in a state, an obvious indicator is the percentage of inhabitants of the
state who reside in a metropolitan area. Accordingly, these indicators need no
justification. For societal stability in a state, the indicator employed is the state
crime rate, because crime reduces interpersonal contacts157 and hence impairs the
ability of a social system to function smoothly. For social system rationality in a
state, the indicator is the percentage of adults who were enrolled in college (either
part-time or full-time) in the state.158 While this indicator may not seem useful on its
157

Allen E. Liska & Barbara D. Warner, Functions of Crime: A Paradoxical Process, 96
AM. J. SOC. 1441, 1460-61 (1991).
158

The college enrollment rate for each state was calculated for this study from the sources
of data for COLLEGERATE identified in note 160 infra. The denominator for the calculation was
the number of inhabitants of each state in 1980 who were at least 18 years old; the numerator
was the number of individuals (male and female) who were enrolled in college in the state in
Fall 1980. Some enrollees, however, were younger than 18. While data on the age
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face, an analysis of data for males 14 to 24 years old concluded that differences
between states in proportions attending college are partly attributable to state
differences in rationality.159
Table 1. Variables in Regression Model160
Variable
(mnemonic label)
APPEARIMPROP

Description of variable
Each state was coded 0 or 1. 0 = the appearance-ofimpropriety standard is not explicit in the enumerated
ethical standards for lawyer conduct that are in force in
the state and has not been used by the highest court of the
state while the current enumerated standards have been in
force; 1 = the appearance-of-impropriety standard is
explicit in the enumerated ethical standards for lawyer
conduct that are in force in the state or, if not explicit in
the current enumerated standards, has been used by the
highest court of the state while the current enumerated
standards have been in force.

distribution of college students was not available for each state, approximately two percent of
all college students nationally in 1980 were under 18 years of age. Computed from NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994, at table 171 (1994),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=94115 [hereinafter DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994]. On average, therefore, the state college enrollment rates in this
study differ slightly from the actual percentages of the adult populations of the states that were
enrolled in college.
159

Michael B. Tannen, The Investment Motive for Attending College, 31 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 489 (1978).
160

The data for the variables were obtained or computed from the following sources:

APPEARIMPROP:

Search of Lexis databases conducted by the author in mid-2005.

COLLEGERATE: DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 1994, supra note 158, at table 186;
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK: 1994, at table A (12th ed. 1994);
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK: 1997-98, at table
A-3 (5th ed. 1998).
CRIMERATE: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, at table 3 (1981); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at table 32 (103rd ed. 1982).
FOREIGNPOP: Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, U.S. Census Bureau, Historical
Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990 (Feb. 1999),
at table 13: Nativity of the Population, for Regions, Divisions, and States: 1850 to 1990,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2006).
METROPOP: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1993, at table 41 (113th ed. 1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/
abs/statab1951-1994.htm [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1993].
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COLLEGERATE

Persons enrolled (part-time or full-time) in college in each
state in Fall 1980 as a percentage of the population age 18
or older in the state.

CRIMERATE

The number of Crime Index crimes in each state in 1980
per 1000 state residents who were at least 15 years of age.
Crime Index crimes are murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor-vehicle theft.

FOREIGNPOP

The percentage of all inhabitants of each state in 1980
who were born outside the United States.

METROPOP

The percentage of all inhabitants of each state in 1980
who resided in a “metropolitan area,” as defined by the
U.S. Census Bureau. A “metropolitan area” encompassed
(i) a core area that had a substantial population and (ii)
communities adjoining the core that were integrated,
economically as well as socially, with the core. Every
metropolitan area included either:
 At least one city with a population of not less than
50,000; or
 Both (i) an urbanized area, as determined by Census
Bureau criteria, with a population of not less than
50,000 and (ii) a total metropolitan area population
of not less than 100,000 (75,000 in New
England).161

For every indicator variable, data were obtained on each of the 44 states that were
included in the study. The variables are measured as of 1980. The year 1980 was
chosen for two reasons. First, data on all of the indicator variables were available for
that year.162 Second, 1980 preceded the introduction of the Model Rules163, and by
161

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1993, supra note 160, at 916-17.

162

An effort was made to include, as an indicator of social system stability, the state
divorce and annulment rate in 1980, i.e., the number of divorces and annulments granted in
1980 in each state per 1000 inhabitants who were at least 15 years of age. However, data on
divorces and annulments in 1980 were incomplete for one of the 44 states. Sally C. Clarke,
Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990,
MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, March 22, 1995, 11, table 2, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/mardiv.htm. As a result, the divorce-annulment rate was omitted
from the statistical analysis. For the 43 states for which the divorce-annulment rate in 1980
was determinable, a zero-order product-moment correlation coefficient of 0.4347 existed
between the divorce-annulment rate and the crime rate (denominated CRIMERATE in Table 1).
Therefore, approximately one-fifth of the variation in each rate is linked to variation in the
other (r2 = (.4347)2 = .189 x 100 = 18.9%), and although the two rates are to some extent
overlapping indicators of societal stability, they are for the most part independent.
163

The Model Rules were promulgated in 1982. Brewer, supra note 131, at 324-25.
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1980 all of the 44 states in the study had endorsed the appearance-of-impropriety
standard for attorneys.164 Since the Model Rules rejected the standard, 1980 is a
useful temporal point (i) for marking the start of the period in history during which
many states abandoned the standard and (ii) for ascertaining whether and how the
four system-level properties predict state retention or rejection of the standard.
A final but important matter involving the research design requires discussion.
The findings of the study do not furnish a basis for definitive conclusions regarding
the impact of the properties. Caution in interpreting the findings is necessary for at
least two reasons. First, the system-level properties under consideration are poorly
understood because they have not been extensively researched by social scientists.
Future research may reveal that each property possesses multiple aspects and that
each aspect requires a different indicator. Accordingly, the selection of indicator
variables was grounded on logic and supposition, not substantial empirical research,
and the indicator variable chosen for a property may not fully capture the property.
Second, the relationship of the four properties to the presence or absence of the
appearance-of-impropriety standard was not assessed with repeated and regular (e.g.,
annual) measures of the properties over time. Such data, especially when they cover
both points in time prior and points in time subsequent to the occurrence or
disappearance of the effect being investigated, are the most appropriate for
identifying causal relationships that involve state-level phenomena.165
C. Data Analysis
The preceding limitations of the research design did not directly affect the data
analysis, but another aspect of the study did. Specifically, the number of
observations (i.e., states) reduced the precision with which the indicator variables
could be measured in analyzing the data. Because there were a total of 44
observations, many cells had no observations—i.e., a frequency of zero—when
APPEARIMPROP was cross-tabulated with the exact percentage or rate of an indicator
variable for a state, i.e., when the measures of the indicator variables were
continuous. However, the data analysis technique that the study employed — viz.,
maximum-likelihood logistic regression—is problematic when there are cells with

164
Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was issued by the
ABA in 1969, provided that “a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980); Brewer, supra note 131, at 324. By
1980, according to a survey by the ABA, Canon 9 had been adopted in all states with the
possible exception of California, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Montana, and New Mexico.
ABA NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
STATE x (1980). Of these six states, Maine was not included in the data. See, supra, note 152.
The remaining five states had adopted, no later than 1980, either Canon 9 or a common-law
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys. Comden v. Superior Court, 576 P.2d 971,
973 (Cal. 1978) (California); DEL. CODE ANN., vol. 16, at 562, 589 (1974) (Canon 9 adopted
in 1971) (Delaware); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 9 App. Rule 3-109 (Harrison 1973) (Canon 9 in
effect in 1973) (Georgia); In re Estate of Sauter, 615 P.2d 875, 878 (Mont. 1980) (Montana);
John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1, 36 n.209 (2001) (finding that Canon 9 was adopted by the Supreme Court of New
Mexico in 1974) (New Mexico).
165

Shepherd, supra note 65, at 213-14.
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zero observations.166 As a result, three categories with approximately equal numbers
of observations (i.e., equal numbers of states) were created for each indicator
variable. When APPEARIMPROP was tabulated by the categories of each indicator
variable, no cell in any of the resulting six-cell tables had fewer than four
observations (states).
Table 2 presents the range of percentages or rates for each of the three categories
of each of the indicator variables. The table also shows the number of states in every
category.
Table 2. Range of Percentages or Rates, and Number of States,
in Categories of the Indicator Variables
Range of percentages or rates,
and number of states, by category
Variable

Low

Medium

High

4.8 to 6.4
N = 14

6.5 to 7.4
N = 15

7.6 to 10.6
N = 15

CRIMERATE

32.9 to 62.1
N = 15

64.3 to 74.4
N = 15

76.2 to 113.2
N = 14

FOREIGNPOP

0.9 to 1.7
N = 12

1.9 to 3.5
N = 16

3.9 to 15.1
N = 16

24.0 to 51.8
N = 14

57.0 to 77.2
N = 15

80.5 to 96.8
N = 15

COLLEGERATE

METROPOP

166

DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 135-38 (2d
ed. 2000).
In principle, each indicator variable in the instant study is measured with data that
constitute a ratio scale, and because such a measure is continuous, the data for each indicator
variable are usable in logistic regression without being collapsed into a few categories. Id. at
136. In practice, however, the data for the indicator variables are more prudently treated as
ordinal scales, because on the variables, the states tended to concentrate at certain numerical
values rather than to be spread evenly across the range of values observed. For example, the
distributions of three of the four indicator variables were at least as peaked as the normal
distribution, and thus were far from flat. The kurtosis coefficient for the individual
(uncollapsed) values of each indicator variable was 3.3 for COLLEGERATE, 2.9 for CRIMERATE,
6.1 for FOREIGNPOP, and 2.0 for METROPOP. The kurtosis coefficient for the normal
distribution is 3.0. STATA CORP., 4 STATA REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 8, at 150 (2003).
The concentration of states at particular numerical values on an indicator variable is
probably not due to the relatively small number of cases supplying the data but, rather, is
likely to inhere in the nature of social systems. To operate effectively, a social system
probably requires that important variables be present in certain amounts or at certain levels;
thus, it is likely that a social system changes when thresholds are reached on one or more
causal variables. If so, in most social science research on states, a relatively few categories
seem to be the most appropriate way to measure an independent variable characterized by
gradations in magnitude.
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The number of states (observations) in the study necessitates consideration of a
further question. Researchers have devoted scant attention to the question of the
minimum number of observations needed for the accurate calculation of statistical
significance by maximum-likelihood logistic regression,167 and hence the number is
uncertain. Nevertheless, some guidelines are available, and they suggest that the
number of observations in the instant study is substantially fewer than the number
that is required168 to generate reliable, unbiased estimates of the characteristics of a
larger universe.169 With these guidelines, accordingly, there is no support for using
tests of statistical significance in the study.
If statistical significance cannot be computed accurately, do the odds ratios
estimated by logistic regression for the current data have any utility? The answer is
that they do, because the odds ratios for the four indicator variables can stand on
their own. Indeed, little if anything has been lost in the instant study from the
inability to know the statistical significance of the odds ratios. To understand why,
the role in research of tests of statistical significance needs to be explained. As I
hope to convey in the explanation that follows, measures of statistical significance
are unnecessary in the instant study even though they are justifiable in much, if not
most, quantitative social science research. The odds ratios themselves can be the
basis for identifying relationships to the appearance-of-impropriety standard of the
system-level properties posited as antecedents of the standard.
The goal of the social and behavioral sciences is to ascertain conditions in and
characteristics of populations (i.e., universes) of human beings or human
organizations. However, data cannot be acquired from all of the members of most
populations due to the economic cost and/or time that would be expended. As a
result, a sample must typically be drawn from the population that is under
investigation, and conclusions about the population must be reached from data
supplied by the sample. The function of tests of statistical significance is to allow
such data to be employed to reach one type of conclusion regarding the population
with knowledge of the likelihood that the conclusion is wrong. Specifically, a test of
significance whose assumptions (e.g., as to sampling procedure) are satisfied

167

Id., at 339.

168

A minimum of 100 observations has been suggested for tests of significance calculated
by maximum-likelihood logistic regression. J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR
CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 53-54 (1997). The present study, of
course, has just 44 observations.
The conclusion that the study lacked sufficient observations for tests of statistical
significance is also reached using the approach proposed by HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra
note 166, at 346-47, for maximum-likelihood logistic regression. The appearance-ofimpropriety standard is employed by twenty-six states and not employed by eighteen. See
supra notes 154-55. Since the least-frequent outcome is eighteen, the regression model in the
instant study would be limited to just a single indicator variable (parameter) under the
Hosmer-Lemeshow approach, and the inclusion of four such variables is excessive. The
number of states with the least-frequent outcome, of course, is partly a function of the total
number of states.
169

Peter Peduzzi et al., A Simulation Study of the Number of Events per Variable in
Logistic Regression Analysis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1373 (1996).
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identifies the probability of error when deciding to reject the “null hypothesis”—the
hypothesis that, in the population, no relationship exists between two variables or no
difference exists between two groups on a particular attribute. In what percentage of
samples from the population would a particular relationship between variables or a
particular difference between groups be found if there is actually no relationship or
no difference in the population, i.e., if the null hypothesis correctly portrays the
population? The answer is the level of statistical significance. The level of
statistical significance thus discloses the probability of erring when the null
hypothesis is rejected on the basis of data garnered from a relatively small number of
members of a population who have been selected with a probability (e.g., random)
sampling procedure.
In short, information on the statistical significance of an odds ratio presupposes
that a sample has furnished the data from which the odds ratio and its statistical
significance have been estimated. If the data used in a study to compute the odds
ratio come from the entire universe of interest, however, statistical significance is
irrelevant. That is the situation in the instant study. The universe for the study is the
states in the continental United States whose acceptance or nonacceptance of the
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys could be determined as of 2005.
Because the data for the study include all states in the continental United States that
had an ascertainable position on the standard in 2005, the data do not result from
sampling, and a test of statistical significance is inappropriate.
However, skepticism of conclusions—especially conclusions regarding causal
relationships—is not eliminated simply because the data underlying the conclusions
cover the entire universe under investigation. While estimates of statistical
significance (even if based on an adequate number of observations) contribute little
or nothing to the instant study,170 the study has potentially major limitations that arise
from the two problems discussed in the last paragraph of part IV-B supra of this
article, namely, possible defects in the measurement of the system-level properties
posited as antecedents of the appearance-of-impropriety standard and the lack of
time-series data on the indicator variables for these properties.
With this background, I turn to the results of the data analysis.171 Table 3
presents the odds ratios from the regression of the appearance-of-impropriety
standard (APPEARIMPROP) on the four indicator variables. In addition, the table
supplies the two-tailed level of statistical significance of the odds ratios for readers
who prefer to ground decisions regarding a regression model on this information.

170

Tests of statistical significance, even though common in social science research, have
fundamental limitations that are often unrecognized or ignored, and use of the tests may be
unjustified even for samples containing an adequate number of observations. LANCELOT
HOGBEN, STATISTICAL THEORY: THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROBABILITY, CREDIBILITY AND ERROR
332-44 (1957).
171

All analyses of the data in this study were conducted with Stata (Release 8.2). The
Stata command LOGISTIC generated the results in table 3 as well as the results in table 4.
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Table 3. Odds Ratios and Two-tailed Significance Levels
for Regression of APPEARIMPROP on Indicator Variables: 44 States

Odds ratio

Standard
Error

z

p >z

COLLEGERATE

0.730

.252

-0.91

0.360

CRIMERATE

1.004

.023

0.16

0.873

FOREIGNPOP

1.491

.616

0.97

0.334

METROPOP

0.976

.018

-1.32

0.186

Variable

Regression model
Number of observations
Log likelihood
Likelihood ratio chi-squared(4)
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R2 (McFadden’s R2)

=
=
=
=
=

44
-28.504
2.53
0.640
0.042

Inherent in the odds ratios reported in table 3 are a number of assumptions
regarding the statistical attributes of the data, and the accuracy of these assumptions
must be probed before the odds ratios are used to draw conclusions regarding
relationships between the indicator variables and APPEARIMPROP. The first
assumption is that outliers did not affect the odds ratios. Outliers are cases (here,
states) characterized by a substantial disparity between the actual (i.e., observed)
outcome on the dependent variable (APPEARIMPROP) and the outcome predicted by
the regression equation. Cook’s Statistic, a measure used to identify influential
outliers,172 was 0.3 or higher for twenty-one states.173 Consequently, the odds ratios
for the regression model in table 3 were re-estimated by omitting each of these states
172
J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT
VARIABLES USING STATA 128 (rev. ed. 2003).
173

One recommendation that has been made by statisticians is to treat Cook’s Statistic as
generally small in magnitude when it is less than 1.0. HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166,
at 180. Another recommendation is to regard Cook’s statistic as small when it is less than the
result obtained from dividing the number 2 by the square root of the number of observations
— here, 2/√44 = 0.3. DAVID A. BELSLEY ET AL., REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 28 (2004). As is
evident from the different recommendations, there are no generally accepted quantitative
criteria for identifying outliers whose influence may be undermining regression results; the
process of determining such influence is acknowledged to be subjective. HOSMER &
LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 176; LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 126.
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one at a time. When the odds ratios from the resulting twenty-one regression
equations (each based on 43 states) were compared to the odds ratios in table 3, the
exclusion of New Mexico proved notable. Moreover, New Mexico had the largest
standardized residual of the 44 states in the study. Accordingly, New Mexico was
omitted from the data analysis, and APPEARIMPROP was regressed on the indicator
variables using 43 states. The results from the regression equation without New
Mexico are reported in table 4.

Table 4. Odds Ratios and Two-tailed Significance Levels for Regression of
APPEARIMPROP on Indicator Variables: 43 States

Odds ratio

Standard
Error

z

p >z

COLLEGERATE

0.623

.235

-1.25

0.210

CRIMERATE

1.013

.025

0.54

0.590

FOREIGNPOP

2.089

.982

1.57

0.117

METROPOP

0.955

.022

-2.01

0.045

Variable

Regression model
Number of observations
Log likelihood
Likelihood ratio chi-squared(4)
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R2 (McFadden’s R2)

=
=
=
=
=

43
-25.973
5.77
0.217
0.100

The second assumption requiring examination prior to accepting the results in
table 3 and/or table 4 is that variation in one independent variable in the regression
model does not correspond exactly to variation in any other independent variable.
The assumption is important because a correlation (i.e., collinearity) between two
independent variables, if sufficiently strong, can prevent multiple regression from
computing a reliable estimate of the odds ratio and coefficient for either of these
independent variables. Multiple regression supplies an estimate of the change in the
dependent variable (denominated Y) that is associated with a unit of change in a
particular independent variable (X1), but in order to estimate accurately the change in
the dependent variable that is attributable to that independent variable (X1) rather
than to another independent variable (X2), multiple regression must be able to
remove the statistical influence of the latter independent variable (X2). If a strong
relationship exists between independent variables X1 and X2, however, multiple
regression may be unable to separate the change in the dependent variable
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attributable to independent variable X1 from the change in the dependent variable
attributable to independent variable X2. When two independent variables are highly
correlated with each other, in short, multiple regression may not generate reliable
estimates of the change that takes place in the dependent variable when a unit of
change occurs in either of these correlated independent variables.174
A reason to believe that collinearity might preclude the reliable estimation of
odds ratios in the instant study is found in the nontrivial zero-order rank correlation
coefficient (Spearman’s rho) for the relationships between pairs of the independent
variables. The independent variables in tables 3 and 4 are the indicator variables for
the system-level properties that have been proposed as possible antecedents of the
appearance-of-impropriety standard (the dependent variable). In the 44-state data set
and in the 43-state data set, the smallest rank correlation coefficient was 0.28. In the
44-state data set, four of the six rank correlation coefficients were 0.57 or higher; in
the 43-state data set, four of the six coefficients were 0.60 or higher. However, the
logistic regression program employed in the data analysis automatically notifies the
investigator when an unacceptable level of collinearity is present,175 and it did not do
so for the results reported either in table 3 or in table 4.176 Accordingly, collinearity
was evidently not a problem, and the second assumption was accepted.
I turn now to the third assumption of the regression model that needs to be tested.
The assumption is that the nature and strength of the relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable is not conditional on any other
independent variable. If the assumption is incorrect, the relationship of independent
variable X1 to the dependent variable differs across the levels or categories of
independent variable X2.177
Such a conditional relationship, in statistical
terminology, involves “interaction” between X1 and X2. Interaction can occur when
the two independent variables are related to each another. As pointed out above in
the discussion of collinearity, the four indicator (independent) variables in the instant
study were characterized by nontrivial rank correlation coefficients in their
relationships to one another. Accordingly, some of the indicator variables may
interact, and the assumption that no interaction is present may be incorrect.
To ascertain interaction between independent variables in a data set, any pair of
the independent variables can be used to create a new variable (“interaction
variable”) that will serve as an additional independent variable. In the instant study,
the numerical values of an interaction variable can be obtained by multiplying, for
each state, the numerical values that start the range of the categories in which the
state falls on the two indicator variables comprising the interaction variable.178
However, if the objective of research is to build theory, the choice of independent
174

WILLIAM D. BERRY, UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 24-27 (1993).

175

STATA CORP., 2 STATA BASE REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 8, at 331 (2003)
[hereinafter 2 STATA MANUAL].
176

Excessive collinearity is evidenced by very large standard errors. BERRY, supra note
174, at 27; HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 141. Visual inspection of table 3 and
table 4 indicates that the standard errors are not abnormal in size.
177

JAMES JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION 3
(2d ed. 2003).
178

The numerical values for the categories are given in table 2.
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variables to examine for potential interaction should be based on existing or
proposed theory. That is, theory on a subject should guide the selection of the
independent variables that can be expected to interact and whose interaction should
be investigated.179
Current macrosociological theory addresses two of the
independent variables in the instant study. Specifically, theory suggests that cultural
heterogeneity and population density reinforce one another.180 Thus, there is reason
to include in the regression model the interaction variable from these properties and
to ascertain whether this interaction variable is related to APPEARIMPROP. If the
interaction variable is related to APPEARIMPROP, the relationship to APPEARIMPROP of
each of its component variables is conditional on the other.181
Differences between states in the level of cultural heterogeneity are captured by
FOREIGNPOP, and differences between states in population density are captured by
METROPOP.
Consequently, the numerical values that begin the range of the
categories of FOREIGNPOP and of METROPOP for each state were multiplied to
generate a new variable, and this interaction variable was included as an independent
variable in a regression equation together with the original four independent
(indicator) variables. The equation was applied to the data set that contained all 44
states and to the data set that contained 43 states (i.e., the data set omitting New
Mexico). The odds ratios for the interaction variable in both data sets departed no
more than ±.012 from 1.000 and thus furnished no evidence that there was a
relationship between the interaction variable and APPEARIMPROP—or at least a
relationship of any practical utility.182 Moreover, because the interaction variable
was created from ordinal-level components that deviated considerably from intervallevel measures, inclusion of the interaction variable in the regression equation is
dubious.183 As a result, the interaction variable is not considered further.

179
See JAMES JACCARD, INTERACTION EFFECTS
(1998); BERRY, supra note 174, at 30-31.

IN

FACTORIAL ANALYSIS

OF

VARIANCE 5

180
Claude S. Fischer, The Subcultural Theory of Urbanism: A Twentieth-Year Assessment,
101 AM. J. SOC. 543, 552 (1995).

Other potential interactions in the instant study lack a theoretical foundation and,
therefore, are not considered. The possibility of an interaction between CRIMERATE and
METROPOP nevertheless deserves mention, because urban areas are evidently characterized by
higher rates of crime overall than are rural locations. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote,
Why Is There More Crime in Cities?, 107 J. POL. ECON. S225 (1999). Certain types of major
crime, however, are not more frequent in urban settings. Fischer, supra, at 560-65. Since
urban size is not related to all types of serious crime, the role of the former in the latter is
unclear, and the interaction variable based on CRIMERATE and METROPOP was omitted from the
regression model.
181

JACCARD & TURRISI, supra note 177, at 18-20.

182

In sample surveys, interactions—especially interactions of large magnitude—are
infrequently found because of the distributions of the independent variables that comprise the
interaction variables. Gary H. McClelland & Charles M. Judd, Statistical Difficulties of
Detecting Interactions and Moderator Effects, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 376, 377, 386 (1993).
183

JACCARD & TURRISI, supra note 177, at 70-72.
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D. Discussion of Findings
How well did the regression model in table 3 and in table 4 predict whether the
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys is present in a state? The model as
a whole—i.e., all four indicator variables together—accurately predicted the
presence or absence of the standard in 59% of the states in table 3 and in 60% of the
states in table 4.184 If the predictions had been made randomly, 50.0% of the states
would have been correctly identified. Consequently, the overall model somewhat
aids prediction. However, the benefit of the model was not uniform. Specifically,
the model was very accurate in predicting the states that adopted the standard, but its
accuracy was quite poor in identifying the states that rejected the standard.185
If the goal of research is to build theory, the most important question confronting
an investigator is not the regression model per se but the particular independent
variables in the model.186 Theory is constructed from independent variables that are
related to the dependent variable, and advances in theory depend on uncovering these
variables. Thus, I turn to the question of whether and how each independent variable
in the regression model under consideration is related to state differences in the
presence/absence of the appearance-of-impropriety standard. Since the odds ratios in
tables 3 and 4 reveal a substantial relationship to the standard on the part of two
indicator variables—viz., COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP—these variables merit
further examination. In discussing them, an explanation of three statistical
concepts—probability, odds, and odds ratio—will be helpful.
The probability of occurrence of a phenomenon is the proportion of the
combined number of occurrences and nonoccurrences that are occurrences, while the
probability of nonoccurrence of a phenomenon is the proportion of the combined
number of occurrences and nonoccurrences that are nonoccurrences. In the instant
data, the probability that the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was
being used in a state is calculated through the division of 26, the number of states
employing the standard, by 44, the total number of states. Thus, the probability of
occurrence of the standard was 26/44 = .59. Conversely, the probability that the
standard was not being used in a state is calculated through the division of 18, the
number of states not employing the standard, by 44. The probability of
nonoccurrence, therefore, is 18/44 = .41.
The probability of a phenomenon, however, differs from the odds of the
phenomenon. When the probability of occurrence of a phenomenon is divided by
the probability of its nonoccurrence, the result is the odds of occurrence, and when
the probability of nonoccurrence of a phenomenon is divided by the probability of
occurrence, the result is the odds of nonoccurrence. In the instant data, the odds that
the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was being employed in a state
184

The calculation was performed by the Stata command LSTAT. 2 STATA MANUAL, supra
note 175, at 309. The calculation used the default predicted probability of the dependent
variable, namely, ≥ 0.5. Id. at 299. The LSTAT output includes the percentages for the
“sensitivity” and the “specificity” of the model, which terms are defined in id. at 323.
185

Among the states having the standard, the percentage of correct predictions was 88%
for the states in table 3 and 81% for the states in table 4. Among the states not having the
standard, the percentage of correct predictions was 17% for the states in table 3 and 29% for
the states in table 4.
186

LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 88.
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is the ratio of .59 (the probability of occurrence) to .41 (the probability of
nonoccurrence), while the odds that a state was not employing the standard is the
ratio of .41 to .59. Thus, the odds that a state was utilizing the standard is .59/.41 =
1.44 (alternatively expressed as 1.44 to 1), while the odds that a state was not
utilizing the standard is .41/.59 = 0.69 (or 0.69 to 1).
The third statistical concept is the odds ratio, i.e., a ratio of two odds. The
numerator in the odds ratio in logistic regression is the odds of the dependent
variable for a category of the independent variable; the denominator is the odds of
the dependent variable for a different category of the same independent variable,
namely, the category that, in terms of numerical score, is immediately below the
category used in the numerator. In the instant study, the odds ratio for an indicator
(independent) variable is the ratio of the odds that the appearance-of-impropriety
standard was being used by a state in one category of the indicator variable relative
to the odds that the standard was being used by a state in the category with the nextlower score. (The categories of each of the indicator variables are given in table 2.)
Thus, the odds ratio for an independent variable specifies the factor by which the
odds of the dependent variable are multiplied when the independent variable
increases by one category,187 and the independent variable is related to the dependent
variable to the degree that its odds ratio deviates from 1.000.
The odds ratios in tables 3 and 4 indicate that relationships of practical
importance existed between COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP, on the one hand, and
APPEARIMPROP, on the other, but the relationships of COLLEGERATE and FOREIGNPOP
to APPEARIMPROP are weaker in table 3 than in table 4. In order to portray the
magnitude of the relationships conservatively, the discussion below will confine
itself to the odds ratios in table 3.
With the other independent variables held constant, the odds that the appearanceof-impropriety standard was used in a state (i) declined by a factor of 0.730 for each
category increase in the percentage of the adult population in the state attending
college, and (ii) rose by a factor of 1.491 for each category increase in the percentage
of the population in the state that was born outside the United States. That is,
removing the effects of the other independent variables, the odds of employing the
standard are multiplied by 0.730 when a state moves up one category in college
attendance and by 1.491 when a state moves up one category in foreign-born
population. The two variables thus work in opposite directions with regard to
whether a state uses the appearance-of-impropriety standard. Expressed in
percentages, each rise in category of college attendance was associated with a 27%
reduction, and each rise in category of foreign-born population was associated with a
49% increase, in the odds that the standard was present in a state.188
The percentage changes (-27% and +49%) for the indicator variables suggest that
cultural heterogeneity had a somewhat stronger relationship to the appearance-ofimpropriety standard than did social system rationality. This conclusion is buttressed
by standardized regression coefficients for the indicator variables.189 For the model
187

FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 11-13, 36-37 (2000).

188

Factor changes (here, 0.730 and 1.491) are translated into percentages by subtracting
1.000 from each factor change and multiplying the remainders by 100.
189
Each coefficient was standardized on the variance of both the dependent variable and
the independent variable. The “fully standardized” coefficients were obtained from the
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in table 3, the standardized coefficients were –0.32 for COLLEGERATE and +0.44 for
FOREIGNPOP.190

Part IV of the instant article is based on the thesis that research can identify the
system-level properties that predict the use of symbols of law, and the discussion to
this point has therefore focused on whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard
was present in states. However, the converse of the above approach merits
consideration, too. Specifically, what is the relationship of the independent variables
to whether the standard was absent from states? The answer to the question is
obtained from the inverse of each odds ratio in table 3, and is 1.371 for
COLLEGERATE and 0.671 for FOREIGNPOP.191 Thus, the odds of the standard being
discontinued by a state are multiplied by a factor of 1.371 for each category increase
in college attendance and by a factor of 0.671 for each category increase in foreignborn population. The (rounded) percentages corresponding to these odds ratios are,
respectively, 37% and –33%.192
In sum, the data analysis suggests that the appearance-of-impropriety standard for
attorneys is not a randomly occurring doctrine of law and that the presence or
absence of the standard is tied to specific system-level properties. Although
indicators rather than direct measures of hypothesized antecedents were employed in
the data analysis, social system rationality and cultural heterogeneity evidently
contribute to whether a state adopts or rejects the standard. This conclusion is
buttressed by trends over time (discussed in Part V below) in indicators of social
system rationality and cultural heterogeneity. The conclusion is also buttressed by
the potential utility of these properties in a sociological theory of law.193
V. CONCLUSION
This article, adopting the perspective of macrosociology, has deemed law to be
an institution of society and has accordingly considered law to be a component of a
system. If law is embedded in a system, the concepts and doctrines of law are
shaped by conditions in that system and facilitate the operation of the system. In this
regard, the article contended that symbols are among the products of law, that
symbols are responses to societal circumstances, and that symbols promote societal
cohesion in the long run. Specifically, the article examined concepts and doctrines
of law that are concerned with the appearance to society that certain things are
LISTCOEF command for Stata and its STD option. LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 320-21.
However, while standardized coefficients in ordinary least-squares regression furnish a
meaningful basis for ascertaining the relative magnitude of the relationship to the dependent
variable of each independent variable, standardized coefficients in logistic regression seem to
allow just a rough comparison of the independent variables, because statisticians have been
unable to devise a standardization procedure for logistic regression that is free of limitations.
See PAMPEL, supra note 187, at 32-34.
190

For table 4, the standardized coefficients were –0.42 for

COLLEGERATE

and +0.70 for

COLLEGERATE

and 0.479 for

FOREIGNPOP.
191

LONG & FREESE, supra note 172, at 147, 320-21.

192

For table 4, the inverse of the odds ratios is 1.605 for

FOREIGNPOP.
193

See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 166, at 184 (stressing the importance of
developing useful theory).
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present. The article hypothesized that, through stimulus generalization, these
concepts and doctrines become symbols when the things to which the concepts and
doctrines refer are socially significant. Because lawyering as an occupation is
important in the United States and generates appearances to which the public is
attentive,194 the appearance-of-impropriety standard in ethical rules for attorneys is
among the concepts and doctrines of law that are symbolic.
If macrosociology is correct in treating a society as a system—i.e., as a set of
interacting, interdependent parts—symbolic concepts and doctrines are not random
but, instead, are responses to identifiable aspects of the society in which they exist.
Accordingly, an analysis was undertaken, with logistic regression, of state-level
quantitative measures of four system-level properties—cultural heterogeneity,
population concentration, social system rationality, and societal stability—to
determine whether any of the four properties predicted the odds that the appearanceof-impropriety standard for attorneys would be present in, rather than absent from, a
state. Two of the properties were found to have substantial predictive power.
Specifically, higher cultural heterogeneity and lower social system rationality raised
the odds that the standard was in use in a state. For each state, the two properties
were measured respectively by categories (ranges) of percentages of inhabitants who
were born outside the United States and by categories (ranges) of percentages of
adults who were enrolled in college.
If social, demographic, and/or economic conditions outside the institution of law
are responsible for concepts and doctrines inside the institution, law is not a selfcontained component of society that operates independently of other components.
Instead, law as an institution is inextricably tied to the social system in which it
exists, and the border between law and other institutions is porous. Unfortunately, a
judgment regarding the utility of the macrosociological approach to law that has
been developed here will not be possible until an appreciable body of well-designed
quantitative research that is pertinent to the approach has accumulated.195 However,
the approach receives support from not just the instant study but from other studies
as well.196 In finding that cultural heterogeneity and social system rationality were
related to whether the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys was
194
For example, a survey conducted in 1995 of a sample of adults in the United States
found that fully nine out of ten respondents had a definite opinion of attorneys; only 9% of the
respondents either lacked an opinion of attorneys or declined to disclose their opinion. Most
respondents viewed attorneys unfavorably: the perception that “lawyers use the legal system
to protect the powerful and get rich” characterized 56% of the respondents, while the
perception that “[l]awyers have an important role to play in holding wrongdoers accountable
and helping the injured” existed among just 35% of the respondents. Tarrance Group &
Mellman, Lazarus & Lake accession no. 230752 (Jan. 13-15, 1995). available at LEXIS,
News and Business, RPOLL File.
195

See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002);
Daniel Klerman, Statistical and Economic Approaches to Legal History, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
1167, 1173-76 (2002).
196

Karen Smith Conway & Michael R. Butler, State Abortion Legislation as a Public
Good —Before and After Roe v. Wade, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 609 (1992); Rick Geddes & Dean
Lueck, The Gains from Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women’s Rights, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 1079 (2002); Barnett, supra note 36, at 637-68.
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maintained or discontinued by states, the instant study strengthens the thesis that law
is a sociological phenomenon and that the concepts and doctrines of law can be
understood only by placing them in their societal context.
In order to explore more fully the implications of the study, I will assume that
social system rationality and cultural heterogeneity operated as causes of state
acceptance or rejection of the appearance-of-impropriety standard. If these
properties are adequately captured by their indicator variables, the juxtaposition of
table 3 and table 5 suggests that the two properties, and the forces behind them,
worked concurrently over time. With regard to table 5, the top panel (panel A)
shows, for each specified point in time, the percentage of the civilian noninstitutionalized population 16 years of age and older in the United States as a whole
that was enrolled in college. As measured by this percentage, social system
rationality reached a plateau around 1980 after rising steadily for three decades. The
bottom panel (panel B) shows, for each specified year, the percentage of the total
population of the United States that was born outside the United States. As
measured by this percentage, cultural heterogeneity declined moderately from the
middle of the twentieth century until about 1970 and then increased substantially
over the next three decades.
All of the states in the study had adopted an appearance-of-impropriety standard
for attorneys by 1980,197 and the states without the standard in 2005 had dropped it
after 1980. Given the shift from universal acceptance to partial acceptance of the
standard, what conclusions can be drawn from bringing together the findings in table
3 and the time-series data in table 5? First, social system rationality, by increasing
until about 1980, eroded support for the appearance-of-impropriety standard before
the start of the period when an appreciable number of states discarded the standard,
and after the period began, the inclination to end the standard was stronger in states
that were relatively high in rationality. Second, cultural heterogeneity, by growing
during the period in which many states discontinued the standard, worked against the
abandonment of the standard, and it promoted retention of the standard in direct
proportion to the degree to which a state was heterogeneous.
Third, the importance of cultural heterogeneity to continuation of the appearanceof-impropriety standard was modestly greater than was the importance of social
system rationality to the abandonment of the standard. However, the effects of both
properties were substantial; i.e., much if not most of the movement away from the
standard after 1980 is evidently attributable to heightened social system rationality,
and much if not most of the resistance to this movement is evidently attributable to
increased cultural heterogeneity. Notably, the relative magnitude of the impact of
each property is roughly consistent with the relative number of states having and not
having the appearance-of-impropriety standard: greater cultural heterogeneity was
associated somewhat more strongly with retention of the standard than greater social
system rationality was associated with termination of the standard, and the number of
states preserving the standard was modestly larger than the number of states
eliminating it.
In short, the retention of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys
was not due to inertia, and the abandonment of the standard was not due to chance.
Instead, two system-level properties were evidently major contributors to whether a

197

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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state accepted or rejected the standard during the time period covered by the study,
and they helped to shape the decision on the standard by the courts and committees
in the state that made the decision. Because the appearance-of-impropriety standard
for attorneys is symbolic, the two properties affected whether symbolism developed
in law.
Table 5. College Enrollment and
Foreign-Born Population: United States
19491950

Fall
1959

Fall
1970

Fall
1980

Fall
1990

Fall
2000

2.6

3.1

6.2

7.2

7.3

7.2

Panel B199

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Percent of U.S.
population born
outside U.S.

6.9

5.4

4.7

6.2

7.9

11.1

Panel A198
Percent of
population age
16+ enrolled in
college

Before leaving the appearance-of-impropriety standard, a comment on
investment advisers is in order. Investment advisers, like attorneys, work in a
government-regulated occupation: an attorney must abide by requirements imposed
by the judiciary of the state(s) in which the attorney is licensed to practice law; an
investment adviser must be registered either with the Securities and Exchange
198

Panel A shows, for each specified point in time, the percentage of the civilian
noninstitutionalized population 16 years of age and older in the United States that was enrolled
in college. The percentages in Panel A were calculated from data in the following sources:
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS: 2003, supra note 136, at table 3; U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey. Table A-1:
Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex and Age (civilian noninstitutional
population), available at http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab1.htm (last visited Nov.
7, 2006). The denominator for the calculation was the number of persons 16 years of age and
older in the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the United States as of September of the
year specified; the denominator for 1949-1950 was as of September 1949.
199
Panel B shows, for each specified year, the percentage of the total population of the
United States that was born outside the United States. The percentages in Panel B are from
the following sources: Gibson & Lennon, supra note 160; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, at table 42 (124th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html.
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Commission (“Commission”) or with a regulatory body of the state in which the
adviser has its main office and business site, and must conform to applicable statutes
and agency rules.200 In two cases, the Commission has expressed concern with
appearances of impropriety in the conduct of investment advisers.201 Notably,
however, such cases are not found after the early 1980s, precisely the point in time
when the prevalence of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys began
to decline in the United States. It is unlikely to be coincidence that, since the early
1980s, the Commission has not mentioned appearances of impropriety in the context
of the duty owed by investment advisers to their clients. Because the movement
away from the appearance-of-impropriety standard was not confined to one
occupation, logic suggests that the movement was not fortuitous. Its explanation,
instead, is presumably found in broadly operating forces.
A final, but controversial, point should be made regarding the macrosociological
approach to law on which this article rests. Specifically, the approach offers the
possibility of predicting, far in advance, the existence and emergence of law on
socially significant topics. To the extent that system-level properties determine the
concepts and doctrines of law, information on the level of and change in pertinent
properties can be used to forecast the law that a society will possess a decade or
more in the future. Predictions will not be uniformly correct, of course, but if the
predictions are grounded on well-designed quantitative research, they will be
accurate more often than they are flawed. At the present time, however, rigorous
quantitative research on the macrosociological aspects of law is scarce, and the
existence and emergence of law on a wide variety of topics cannot be predicted with
confidence.
Why is prediction possible? From a macrosociological perspective, particular
personalities—no matter how charismatic or colorful they might be—are merely the
vehicles through which the properties of society, and the large-scale forces that
determine them, mold the fundamental content of law and generate fundamental
shifts in this content. The negligible importance of individuals in shaping law is
evidenced, inter alia, by the similarity of concepts and doctrines of state law across
the country,202 because the legislators, judges and government-agency officials
promulgating law in one state are not the individuals who are the legislators, judges

200
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, 80b-3a (2000). An investment adviser, even though registered with
a state and not with the Commission, remains subject to the prohibition against fraud imposed
by section 206 of the federal Investment Advisers Act and implementing rules adopted by the
Commission. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Release No. IA-1601, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,480, 68,490 (Dec. 27, 1996); Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-1633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,127, 28,128 (May 22, 1997).
201
In re Steadman Security Corp., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Admin. Proc. File No. 3-3101,
1974 SEC LEXIS 3639, at *103, *104 (Dec. 20, 1974); Report of Investigation in the Matter
of Bull & Bear Management Corp., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 769, 1981 SEC
LEXIS 931, at *8 (Aug. 7, 1981).
202
The commonality of law in the United States is illustrated by “model” statutes and
rules. The large number of, and wide range of subjects covered by, such statutes and rules is
indicated by the contents of the “Model Acts & Uniform Laws” database in LEXIS (category
ID 3002030). While the statutes and rules as adopted undoubtedly differ in some ways
between states, they necessarily possess an underlying similarity.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

45

334

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:289

and government-agency officials promulgating law in another state.203 Societal-level
properties, on the other hand, have broad effects and are likely to be at work
throughout the United States (although their level/intensity may differ between
states). In addition, societal-level properties generally seem to develop at a gradual
pace, not abruptly. As a result, the ideas of law whose emergence, modification and
abandonment are due to such properties and the forces behind them can in principle
be anticipated well in advance. In the study reported in the instant article,
differences between states in the level/intensity of two particular system-level
properties were found to predict use of the appearance-of-impropriety standard for
attorneys a quarter of a century later.
Given the potential predictability of law, let me revisit and assess a prediction I
made in a publication in 1993.204 Specifically, I contended that, as the result of
societal changes, law in the United States was likely “in the next two decades”
explicitly to authorize physicians to assist in terminating the life of mentally
competent individuals who requested assistance to end their suffering from
physically stressful, incurable medical conditions that were expected to be fatal.205
In the years since this prediction was made, the state of Oregon has adopted a statute
allowing physician-assisted suicide under such conditions,206 and the United States
Supreme Court has rejected an attempt by the executive branch of the federal
government to prohibit physicians from using federally regulated medications to aid
individuals in ending their lives in accordance with the requirements and procedures
of a state statute.207 On the other hand, Oregon is the only U.S. state to date that has
legalized physician-assisted suicide,208 and the Supreme Court has ruled that statutes
barring physician-assisted suicide do not violate either the due process guarantee209
or the equal protection guarantee210 of the national Constitution.
Statutes on physician-assisted suicide are a type of symbolic law211 because
physician-assisted suicide is a socially important topic and is unlikely, if legalized, to
203

In the macrosociological approach I am advocating, the rate of replacement of—i.e., the
rate of personnel turnover among—the individuals who are legislators, judges and
government-agency officials may affect the timing of a basic change in law but does not
determine whether the change occurs.
204

BARNETT, supra note 3, at ch. 6.

205

Id. at 140.

206

Death with Dignity Act, 13 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.995 (2006). The history of the
Act is reviewed in OREGON DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 6-7 (March 9, 2006), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ar-index.shtml.
For a summary of the specific
requirements of the Act, see id. at 7-8.
207

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).

208
The legal status of physician-assisted suicide worldwide is reviewed by Emily Wada,
Note, A Pretty Picture: The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide, 27
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275 (2005).
209

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

210

Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).

211

See supra notes 62, 64-67 and accompanying text.
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alter existing practices. As to the social importance of the topic, more than three out
of five adults in the United States reject the conclusion of the Supreme Court that
statutory prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide are constitutional212 and thus
believe that they possess an inherent right under certain conditions to end their lives
with the aid of a physician. At the same time, a majority of adults in the country as a
whole consider the enactment of a statute legalizing physician-assisted suicide to be
important.213 As to the impact of legalizing physician-assisted suicide, fewer than 4
in 1000 deaths in Oregon have resulted from a lethal dose of medication obtained
under the terms of the state statute allowing physician-assisted suicide.214 Therefore,
like law generally that deals with social issues,215 law on physician-assisted suicide
does not substantially alter a society but, instead, manifests the existing attributes of
the society and serves as a symbol.
My 1993 prediction that physician-assisted suicide would be explicitly and
widely legalized in the United States over the course of the following two decades
will almost certainly prove wrong in terms of timing. Formal approval of the
practice continues to be likely—e.g., through legislation and/or written
interpretations of existing statutes by state attorneys general—but it will involve a
much longer period of time than I anticipated. Probably the main cause of the delay
is that physician-aided suicide has been largely legalized de facto. That is, a
substantial number of physicians in the United States evidently help terminally ill
patients to end their lives,216 and even though the practice is not authorized by
statute, physicians are rarely prosecuted for it.217 Because the practice has been
legalized de facto, there is less pressure on society to revise existing statutes that ban
the practice.
Nonetheless, physician-assisted suicide is likely to be expressly and widely
authorized by state law in the future. Legalization de jure of physician-assisted
suicide can be expected because of social values—Americans accept the practice and
want statutes that allow it. For example, in national sample surveys of adults in the
United States conducted from 1994 to 2005, no less than three out of five
respondents preferred that their state adopt a statute allowing physician-aided suicide
212
Louis Harris & Assoc. accession no. 282134 (July 9-14, 1997), available at LEXIS,
News and Business, RPOLL File; Harris Interactive accession no. 395078 (Dec. 14-19, 2001),
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File.
213
International Communications Research accession no. 394148 (April 25-May 20, 2001),
available at LEXIS, News and Business, RPOLL File. The findings of this survey are
presented infra note 220 and its accompanying text.
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Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
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Physicians at Risk?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 349, 355 (2005) (noting that “the number of
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with conditions and requirements comparable to those in the Oregon act.218 Further,
legalization of physician-aided suicide is an issue that seems to be of more than
minimal concern to most Americans. In a sample survey of adults in the United
States conducted during 2001, almost three out of five respondents believed that
passage “within the next year” of a federal statute allowing physician-assisted
suicide219 in cases of terminal illness was “important,” “very important,” or
“extremely important,” while somewhat less than two out of five respondents
thought such a statute either was “not important” or should not be adopted.220
Notably, broad support for the legalization of physician assistance to end the lives of
terminally ill patients is not recent—legalization has been favored by a majority of
Americans since the mid-1980s.221 Over time, furthermore, support for legalization
will become stronger in the United States as the older generation, which is less
inclined than the younger generation to endorse legalization, is removed from the
population by death.222 Law formally permitting physician-assisted suicide can thus
be expected to emerge in most if not all states in the future.
Why are social values supportive of a change in law on this topic? Probably the
most important factor in current social values is social system rationality.
Rationality seems to have reached the point where most participants in U.S. society
want the option of selecting the manner and timing of their deaths from a
progressive, terminal illness.223 As the United States has added to its stock of
knowledge, reason and individualism have increased.224 The result has been an

218
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erosion of public acceptance of rules that deny personal choice. Heightened social
system rationality was found to be related to the abandonment by states of the
appearance-of-impropriety standard for attorneys, and it is likely to contribute as
well to the elimination of law that prohibits individuals with a terminal illness from
opting for physician assistance to end their lives.225

The growth of knowledge promoted reason and individualism through a two-step process.
In the first step, advances in technology raised enrollments in primary and secondary schools.
Richard Rubinson & John Ralph, Technical Change and the Expansion of Schooling in the
United States, 1890-1970, 57 SOC. EDUC. 134 (1984). The number of students was boosted by
the higher personal income that schooling generates. Kathryn Wilson, The Determinants of
Educational Attainment: Modeling and Estimating the Human Capital Model and Education
Production Functions, 67 S. ECON. J. 518, 545 (2001). In the second step, higher personal
income increased individualism. Ron Lesthaeghe, A Century of Demographic and Cultural
Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions, 9 POPULATION &
DEV. REV. 411, 429-30 (1983). By definition, individualism is characterized by rationality:
individualism entails “a mode of life in which the individual . . . follows out his own ideas;
free and independent individual . . . thought.” 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 (2nd ed.
1989).
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If increased social system rationality will be a major force behind the de jure
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, such legalization will in general occur the earliest in
states characterized by the highest level of rationality. The fifteen states that were in the
highest category of COLLEGERATE in table 2, and by this measure were highest in social system
rationality, were (in alphabetical order) Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

49

